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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper reviews recent theory and empirical evidence testing unitary versus 
collective models of the household. In contrast to the unitary model, the collective model 
posits that individuals within households have different preferences and do not pool their 
income. Moreover, the collective model predicts that intrahousehold allocations reflect 
differences in preferences and "bargaining power" of individuals within the household. 
Using new household data sets from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and South Africa, 
we present measures of individual characteristics that are highly correlated with 
bargaining power, namely human capital and individually-controlled assets, evaluated at 
the time of marriage. In all country case studies we reject the unitary model as a 
description of household behavior, but to different degrees. Results suggest that assets 
controlled by women have a positive and significant effect on expenditure allocations 
toward the next generation, such as education and children's clothing. We also examine 
individual-level education outcomes and find that parents do not have identical 
preferences toward sons and daughters within or across countries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is growing evidence that the household cannot be characterized as one 
where individuals share the same preferences or pool their resources. New research has 
shown that the unitary model of the household has been rejected in a variety of country 
settings in both developed and developing countries (see Strauss and Thomas 1995; 
Behrman 1997; Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997 for reviews). Although the 
unitary model continues to be extremely powerful in explaining many phenomena, the 
evidence in favor of a model where individuals within the household have different 
preferences, or maintain control over their own resources, is of interest to researchers and 
policymakers alike. 
 In the concluding chapter of their book, Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997) 
argue that using the unitary model of the household as a guideline for policy prescriptions 
may lead to four types of policy failures. First, the effect of public transfers may differ, 
depending on the identity of the income recipient. If this is so, targeting transfers to the 
household may not result in the desired consequences, if transfers directed to the husband 
or the wife have different impacts. Second, the response of nonrecipients of the income 
transfer must also be considered. If households reallocate resources away from the 
transfer recipient to compensate for the transfer receipt, the intended effect of the income 
transfer may not be realized. Third, at the project level, the unitary model predicts that it 
does not matter to whom policy initiatives are addressed, since information, like other 
resources within the household, will be shared. However, numerous examples, many 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, have shown that targeting one individual, rather than the other,  2 
   
has led to nonadoption of particular policies or unintended consequences of policies 
adopted. Lastly, adherence to a unitary model of the household disables many policy 
levers that could be brought to bear on development problems. The unitary model 
predicts that household behavior can be changed only by changes in prices and household 
incomes. In contrast, the collective model posits that a large range of policies can be used 
to affect household allocation outcomes, such as changes in access to common property 
resources, credit, public works schemes, and legal and institutional rights. 
 While the evidence rejecting the unitary model is growing, the body of research 
from which generalizations can be drawn is still limited. Since the diversity of social 
structures makes generalizations difficult, few studies have been replicated over a range 
of conditions and cultures (Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman 1997). One could question, 
for example, whether the results of these studies are invariant to the policy regime the 
household faces. Moreover, there are clearly other factors that affect intrahousehold 
allocation, such as the extended family, community, and other social groups. More 
important, whether existing empirical work in economics adequately captures the specific 
cultural contexts in which individuals within household and families make decisions can 
be questioned. Most household surveys, while collecting information on individual 
outcomes, often are not designed to collect data with which to characterize 
decisionmaking processes.  
 This paper attempts to expand the literature on intrahousehold allocation in two 
ways. First, it applies the same methodological framework to test the unitary model in 
four regionally-diverse countries with very different social and economic conditions.  3 
   
Second, it uses data sets that have been specifically designed to examine intrahousehold 
allocation and household decisionmaking, drawing on qualitative information to create 
culturally-specific but quantifiable indicators of bargaining power. The results suggest 
that much can be gained from applying the common framework to the design and 
analysis of household surveys. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theory and empirical 
evidence testing unitary versus collective models of the household. Section 3 discusses 
the determinants and measurement of individuals’ bargaining power, focusing on asset 
measures as indicators of power. Section 4 presents separate analyses of expenditure 
shares and children’s educational outcomes as functions of male and female assets based 
on new data collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute in four 
countries. Section 5 summarizes the results and discusses the policy implications. 
 
2. MODELING HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR:  A REVIEW
1 
UNITARY VERSUS COLLECTIVE MODELS 
Unitary Models 
 The theory of the household was brought into mainstream economics by Gary 
Becker in the mid-1960s. Following this line of work, most economists see the household 
as a collection of individuals who behave as if they are in agreement on how best to 
combine time, goods purchased in the market, and goods produced at home to produce 
                                                 
1This draws heavily from Behrman (1997), Haddad, Hoddinott, and Alderman (1997), Strauss and Beegle 
(1996), and Strauss and Thomas (1995).   4 
   
commodities that maximize some common welfare index. Though this approach 
originates in standard demand analysis, it has been extended to include the determinants 
of education, health, fertility, divorce, child fostering, migration, labor supply, home 
production, land tenure, and crop adoption (cf. Becker 1973). This approach is appealing 
because of the relative simplicity of comparative statics generated and the diversity of 
issues it can address. It is sometimes called the "common preferences" model or the 
"altruism" model or the "benevolent dictator" model, based on the notion that either all 
household members share the same preference function or that a single decisionmaker 
acts for the good of the entire household. We call it the unitary model because this label 
describes how the household acts—as one with a single preference function. 
 More formally, suppose that the household consists of two individuals, m and f. 
Under the unitary model, all members of the household share the same preferences (or 
alternatively all decisions are made by a dictator, benevolent or otherwise). Household 
members derive utility from the consumption of a vector of individual commodities x 
(including goods and leisure), influenced by a vector of household characteristics g g, some 
of which are unobservable.
2  The household's utility function is given by 
 
 U ( x ; g g ), (1) 
which is maximized subject to an income constraint: 
 
 Y = yj + ym + yf.. (2) 
                                                 
2We denote vectors in bold (e.g., x); individual elements of the vector, such as xi are in ordinary type.   5 
   
 Total household income is composed of joint income yj and individual incomes ym 
and yf. Since it is assumed preferences are identical, income is pooled and maximization 
leads to a series of demand functions for x, which are functions of prices p, total 
household income Y, and household characteristics g g.
3 
 
 xi = xi ( p,Y ; g g ) (3) 
 
For a given set of prices and pooled income, resources are allocated to household 
members according to their ability to translate those resources into goods from which the 
household derives utility. 
 The unitary model is quite powerful; for example, it helps explain two important 
areas of household behavior:  decisions regarding the quantity of goods consumed and 
the equal or unequal allocation of those goods among household members. Thus, despite 
a common misperception, the unitary model is able to explain differences in individual 
well-being and consumption patterns within a household, even when these differences are 
exhibited systematically by gender, age, or relation to household head grouping (cf. 
Becker 1981). For example, differences in allocation may be explained by different 
productivities that lead to higher incomes shared by all members. An empirical example 
of this approach is provided by Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan (1990), who extend the 
agricultural household model (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986) by incorporating 
                                                 
3That is not to say that the identity of the income earner is unimportant in unitary models. If the price of 
leisure, (wage), of m and f differ, then changes to the wage of either is likely to have different demand 
impacts for other goods, due to gender specific cross price effects with wages.   6 
   
individual work effort as a choice variable in the household welfare function. They show 
that unequal calorie allocations across gender and age classes may reflect different 
distributions of activities within those classes.  
 The existence of a single household welfare function reflecting the preferences of 
all members is not an innocuous assumption, however. If individual household members 
have different preferences, then these differing preferences must be aggregated in some 
fashion; the social choice literature illustrates the theoretical difficulties associated with 
this. Moreover, while the unitary approach allows person-specific prices, it assumes that 
all household resources (income, capital, labor, and land) are pooled. If preferences are 
not common to all household members, at least one household member must have the 
ability to monitor the others and to sanction those who fall foul of its rules, an issue both 




 Concerns regarding the assumptions underlying the unitary model have spawned a 
number of alternatives that weaken those assumptions and focus on the individuality of 
household members and the possible differences in their preferences. One class of these 
are the so-called collective models (Chiappori 1988b, 1992, 1997), which allow differing 
preferences and only assume that allocations are made in such a fashion that the 
                                                 
4Perhaps the most persuasive attempt to resolve the problems of aggregation and enforcement is Becker's 
"rotten-kid theorem" (1974, 1981).   7 
   
outcomes are Pareto optimal or Pareto efficient.
5  All collective models have two 
common features:  first, they allow different decisionmakers to have different 
preferences, and, second, they do not require a unique household welfare index to be 
interpreted as a utility function, thereby allowing the index to be dependent on prices and 
incomes as well as "tastes" (Chiappori 1992). As a consequence, both unitary and 
collective models permit existing intrahousehold resource allocation rules to affect 
household responses to public policy. However while both models allow public policy to 
change intrahousehold allocations of a good, only the collective model permits public 
policy to affect the rules of intrahousehold allocation. 
 In the collective model as described above, nothing is assumed a priori about the 
nature of the decision process, i.e., it does not directly address the question of how 
individual preferences lead to a collective choice. This does not mean that the distribution 
rule governing intrahousehold allocation is not important, but rather that it has to be 
estimated from the data rather than postulated a priori. This more general viewpoint is 
especially convenient for assessing the relative suitability of the competing frameworks. 
In particular, an important finding is that the efficiency hypothesis is sufficient to 
generate strong testable restrictions on household behavior (Chiappori 1992). 
 If one is willing to put more structure on the decisionmaking process, two 
subclasses of collective models emerge, one rooted in cooperative and the other in 
noncooperative game theory. In the cooperative approach, individuals have a choice of 
remaining single or of forming a household or other grouping. They choose the latter 
                                                 
5A Pareto optimal allocation is reached when one individual within the household can only be made better-
off at the expense of another household member.  8 
   
option when the advantages associated with being in a household outweigh those derived 
from being single.
6 The existence of the household generates a surplus, which will be 
distributed among its members; the rule governing this distribution is the central issue of 
the analysis. Unitary models represent a special case of cooperative collective models 
where preferences are identical and, as a consequence, resources are pooled. 
 Within the cooperative subclass are examples that represent household decisions 
as the outcome of some bargaining process applying the tools of cooperative game 
theory. The division of the gains from marriage, then, can be modeled as a function of the 
"fallback" or "threat point" position of each member: itself a function of extra 
environmental parameters (EEPs) such as laws concerning access to common property 
and prohibitions on women working outside the home (McElroy 1990). The vast majority 
of bargaining models rely on a Nash solution (Nash 1953).
7 
 The second subclass of collective models are those that rely on noncooperative 
game theory. While all cooperative models are Pareto efficient, only some 
noncooperative ones exhibit this property; so not all of them would be included here. 
Instead, they would be part of the group of noncollective models, i.e., those that do not 
satisfy Pareto efficiency. 
                                                 
6The distribution of gains within marriage is a common application of cooperative models. However, it is 
possible that individuals (particularly females) may not have a choice about getting married or forming a 
household. One can argue that, in many contexts, the decision to marry or form a new household may be 
motivated by non-economic factors, such as society's views of individuals who do not marry.  
7The Nash-bargained solution can also be reached through more complex negotiating procedures. Under 
quite general conditions, Harsanyi and Selten (1987) show that a sequential bargaining process converges 
to the Nash-bargained solution, if one exists.  9 
   
 The noncooperative approach (Ulph 1988; Kanbur 1991; Carter and Katz 1997; 
Lundberg and Pollak 1993) relies on the assumption that individuals cannot enter into 
binding and enforceable contracts with each other. Instead, an individual's actions are 
conditional on the actions of others. The conditionality of action implies that not all 
noncooperative models are Pareto optimal. However, work by McElroy suggests that this 
is not as serious as it may seem because noncooperative solutions can serve as threat 
points in cooperative models. As McElroy (1992) notes, dissolution of the group is not a 
credible threat in a cooperative bargaining model in the context of small daily decisions. 
 
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF HOUSEHOLD MODELS 
 Since differential allocations across household members are consistent with both 
unitary and collective models, the empirical challenge lies in testing whether or not such 
differentials are consistent with a unitary model of the household, or with a 
decisionmaking process in which different household members have different preferences 
and varying abilities to enforce these. If the unitary model does not hold, then 
policymakers have an additional lever with which to influence intrahousehold outcomes. 
 
Pareto Efficiency 
 Testing Pareto efficiency of household resource allocations is one general test of 
the collective model.
8  If the assumption of Pareto efficiency is rejected, it is possible to 
improve household welfare by reallocating resources within the household. Suppose that 
                                                 
8The discussion in the next two sections follows Thomas and Chen (1994) and Bourguinon et al. (1993) 
closely.  10 
   
the household is composed of two individuals, m and f. Assume that each has altruistic 
preferences, in the sense that each cares about the other's consumption of a private good, 
xm and xf, respectively. Let all public goods be represented by the vector x0. For all 
Pareto-efficient allocations, there exists some µ so that the household optimization 
program is 
 Max µ Um (xm, xf,  x0; g g) + (1-µ) Uf (xm, xf,  x0; g g), (4) 
 
 px + p x0 = Y , (5) 
 
where p is a vector of prices for both private and public goods and Y is income. The 
weighting function µ is a function of prices, incomes, and household characteristics, 
while the demand for any private good xi is a function of prices and income as well as the 
weights µ. 
 
 xi = xi ( p, Y ; µ, g g ) .  (6) 
 
Conditional on µ, the demand functions satisfy the properties of homogeneity, adding-up, 
and Slutsky symmetry. Treating the weights as endogenous leads to a series of Slutsky-
like conditions and testable restrictions on the data (Browning and Chiappori 1994). 
Given three sources of income, e.g., yj, ym, yf, and differentiating the demand functions, 
the ratio of any two income effects ( Mxi/ Mym )/ ( Mxi/ Myf ) is independent of i—which is 
true for both public and private goods. This result, which states that the ratio of male-to- 11 
   
female income effects is identical across all pairs of goods, is a simple and powerful test 
of Pareto efficiency.
9 
Recently, further tests of Pareto efficiency have emerged in the literature. Fortin 
and Lacroix (1997) posit a flexible structural model of labor supply and derive the 
restrictions required for it to satisfy the unitary and/or collective models. This allows 
them to simultaneously test the nested models. Browning and Chiappori (1998) also 
provide a new set of nested tests of the unitary, collective, and noncollective models. As 
in their earlier work, they demonstrate that Pareto efficiency implies restrictions on 
household demands.
10  Both of these papers use data from Canada and generally reject 
the unitary model but fail to reject Pareto efficiency, or the collective model, for couples. 
The various tests described above are not, however, unproblematic. In particular, 
plausible extensions to the model, such as the inclusion of household production, have 
called into question their validity (Apps and Rees 1997; Chiappori 1997). When 
household production is included in the model, so that one’s time can no longer be neatly 
divided into market work and leisure, special assumptions on the production process must 
be made in order to retain the main results regarding recoverability of the sharing rule. It 
is not clear what sort of biases this may introduce in the tests but does suggest that 
examining individual consumption levels or outcomes and more realistically modeling 
households should be an important component of future research. 
                                                 
9Using data from France and Canada, Bourguinon et al. (1993, 1994) find that the ratio of income effects is 
not unity, and so reject income pooling. However, the ratios are constant across a range of commodities, so 
the data are consistent with Pareto efficiency. Similar evidence for Taiwan is found in Thomas and Chen 
(1994). 
10The tests are based on the structure of what they call the pseudo-Slutsky matrix, derived in the paper. 
  12 
   
Finally, not all the evidence supports the collective model and Pareto efficiency. 
Extending to agricultural household models, Udry (1996) notes that Pareto efficiency for 
a household implies efficiency in its productive activities as well (i.e., profit 
maximization). He finds that this is not true in Burkina Faso, where plots controlled by 
women are farmed less intensively than those controlled by men, implying inefficiency. 
 
Income Pooling 
Tests of income pooling allow another interpretation of collective models. 
Suppose that public goods allocations, x0, are given. Suppose further that preferences are 
"caring," i.e., one person cares about the other's allocation to the extent that it gives the 
person individualistic welfare. This imposes weak separability in the individual's utility 
function, Uf (xf, w(xm); x0). This can then be interpreted in the context of two-stage 
budgeting. In the first stage, all household members pool their incomes and allocate it 
according to some sharing rule. In the second stage, each household member maximizes 
his or her utility, given the income share, conditional on choices regarding the household 
public good. The income sharing rule is related to the weights µ; these weights also 
provide an indicator of the individual's relative bargaining power within the household. 
(A more powerful individual would command a greater share of the household's 
resources.) 
Suppose that there is no price variation (as is typical of a cross-section survey), 
and we want to test the effects of individual incomes. The demand functions can be 
written as a series of Engel curves:  13 
   
 
 xi = xi ( ym, yf, Y ; µ, g g ). (7) 
 
Holding household income constant, the effect of individual income on demand can be 
interpreted as the impact of changing the share of household income allocated to member 
i. According to the common preference model, these effects are zero.
11 
 Testing for Pareto efficiency involves testing the cross-equation restrictions and 
verifying that the ratio of any two income effects is independent of i, and is equivalent to 
the test: 
 
 [( Mxi/ Mym) / ( Mxi/  Myf) - ( Mx j/ Mym) / ( Mxj/ Myf)] = 0 for all i „ j (8) 
 
for all pairs of goods. It is important to use appropriate income measures to test the ratios 
of income effects. Total income is not exogenous, nor is it likely to be measured without 
error. Several studies that point out the greater effect of women's income shares on 
household food expenditure, household calorie availability, and child health and nutrition 
outcomes use total income. This is appropriate only if the endogeneity of labor income is 
explicitly considered, since it is affected by time allocation and labor force participation 
decisions. We return to this issue subsequently.  
 
                                                 
11This is not equivalent to a rejection of the unitary model per se. Non-zero effects are consistent with 
“altruism” or “dictatorial” models within the unitary framework.  14 
   
Bargaining Models 
 The Nash-bargaining model, a cooperative bargaining model, provides another 
convenient illustration of empirical tests of collective models. Consider two individuals, 
m and f. As individuals not cooperating in any activities, their utility functions are 
 
 Um
0(x0, xm, Lm) and Uf
0(x0, xf, Lf), (9) 
 
respectively. Here, xm is a good consumed by m (such as food, water, or health care), xf is 
a good consumed by f, Lm and Lf are leisure, and x0 is a public good consumed both when 
individuals cooperate and when they do not. Let p be a vector of the prices of all goods, 
w be the wage rates of m and f, and Nf and Nm their respective nonwage incomes. 
Unearned incomes are used as arguments rather than total income because the former will 
not be affected by labor supply decisions. If m and f do not cooperate, their individual 
utility functions are each maximized subject to their individual full income constraints. 
We can write their indirect utility functions as 
 
 Vm
0(p0, pm, wm, Nm; am) and Vf
0(p0, pf, wf, Nf; af). (10) 
 The V
0's are interpreted as "threat points," the utility obtained independent of 
cooperation,
12 while the a's are referred to as EEPs. In the context of household 
formation, these EEPs affect the relative desirability of being single and may include 
                                                 
12Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) interpret the threat point as the utility 
associated with divorce, while in noncooperative models, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the threat point 
could correspond to a noncooperative outcome within marriage, such as reverting to traditional gender 
roles.   15 
   
access to common property resources and divorce laws. Now suppose that these two 
individuals are considering cooperating in some activity. There are a number of reasons 
why this might be advantageous. For example, there may be economies of scale 
associated with the production of certain goods (household or nonhousehold), or there 
may be some goods that can be produced and shared by couples but not by single 
individuals (e.g., children, in some societies). Denote utility functions when cooperating 
in a joint activity as Um and Uf, respectively, where U is defined over the household 
public good and individual consumption of goods and leisure. 
 Both individuals gain from cooperation when Uj - Vj > 0, and j = m, f. How are 
these gains from cooperation apportioned?  One approach is to assume that these 
individuals negotiate with each other. The outcome of this is a binding and enforceable 
agreement regarding the division of gains from cooperation. One such agreement, which 
has received much discussion in the literature, is to assume that individuals agree to 
maximize a "Nash utility gain product function."  This takes the form of 
M = (Um - Vm)(Uf - Vf). This is maximized subject to a joint full income constraint 
yielding demand functions (for, say, food, water, health care) of the following form: 
 
 xi  = xi (p, w, Nm, Nf;  am,  af); i = 0, m, f ; (11) 
 Li  = Li (p, w, Nm, Nf;  am, af); i = m, f. (12) 
 
 Note that in addition to prices of goods and leisure, these demand functions 
include the extrahousehold environmental parameters. Moreover, individual nonwage  16 
   
incomes affect both the threat points and the demand functions. As McElroy (1990) 
emphasizes, the unitary model is a special case of this Nash model, with the parameters 
on Nm and Nf set equal to each other, and the parameters on ai set equal to zero.  
 Empirical tests of specific bargaining models, such as the Nash bargaining model, 
are more restrictive than tests of the collective model. Chiappori (1988a, 1988b) has 
argued that the Nash-bargaining assumption is overly restrictive and does not yield easily 
testable restrictions, unless the premarital (indirect) utility function is known. One 
empirical solution to this problem has been to estimate indirect utility functions for single 
person households and then to assume that these represent the threat points for "similar" 
persons in two-person households (Montalto 1995). However, this presupposes that 
individual preferences do not change within marriage, and that there is no "selection" into 
marriage. If we assume only that household allocations are Pareto efficient, but parents 
have different preferences, household demands should be affected only by prices and 
individual components of unearned income (Thomas 1990). A test of the equality of 
unearned income effects suffices to test the common preference model against a broad 
class of alternatives, but is not a specific test of bargaining models. 
 
3. BARGAINING POWER:  DETERMINANTS AND MEASUREMENT 
 The above discussion has indicated that "bargaining power" determines the share 
of resources allocated to an individual within the household. However, the concept of 
bargaining power is elusive. It is perhaps useful, at this point, to outline the possible 
determinants of bargaining power, while not making any claims to measure power itself.  17 
   
DETERMINANTS OF BARGAINING POWER 
 Bargaining power is affected by four sets of determinants: (1) control over 
resources, such as assets; (2) influences that can be used to influence the bargaining 
process; (3) mobilization of interpersonal networks; and (4) basic attitudinal attributes.
13  
 Economic analysis of bargaining power has tended to focus on economic 
resources exogenous to labor supply as a major determinant of bargaining power. These 
include assets (e.g., Doss 1996; Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997; Quisumbing 
1994), unearned income (Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990), or transfer payments and welfare 
receipts (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas 1997). The threat of 
withdrawing both oneself and one’s assets from the household grants the owner of those 
assets some power over household resources. These threats are credible if supported by 
community norms or divorce laws. Indeed, Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) 
use assets at marriage as an indicator of bargaining power because in most of Indonesia, 
spouses can take what they brought into the marriage with them were the marriage to 
dissolve.  
 Factors that can influence the bargaining process include legal rights, skills and 
knowledge, the capacity to acquire information, education, and bargaining skills. Some of 
these influences are external to the individual (e.g., legal rights), but many of them are 
highly correlated with human capital or education. In some instances, domestic violence 
can be used to extract resources from spouses or their families, as in the case of dowry-
related violence in India (Rao 1997; Bloch and Rao 1996). Individuals can also mobilize 
                                                 
13This draws heavily on Jean-Pierre Habicht's presentation during the External Advisory Committee of the 
USAID/WID project, "Strengthening Development Policy through Gender Analysis," May 20-21, 1999.  18 
   
personal networks to improve their bargaining power. Membership in organizations, 
access to kin and other social networks, and "social capital" may positively influence a 
person's power to affect household decisions.
14 Lastly, basic attitudinal attributes that 
affect bargaining power include self-esteem, self-confidence, and emotional satisfaction. 
While the economic literature has not dealt extensively with this issue, part of the success 
of group-based credit programs such as the Grameen Bank has been attributed to its 
group-based empowerment approach. Many NGOs have explicit empowerment 
objectives that go beyond economic means to include legal awareness, political 
participation, and use of contraception (Schuler, Hashemi, and Riley 1997b).  
 
MEASURING THE DETERMINANTS OF POWER 
 Attempts to measure the bargaining power of individuals within the household in 
the economics literature have focused on control over economic resources. Candidate 
proxies for bargaining power have included (1) public provision of resources to a 
particular member of the household and exogenous policy changes that affect the 
intrahousehold distribution of these resources (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; 
Rubaclava and Thomas 1997); (2) shares of income earned by women (Hoddinott and 
Haddad 1995); (3) unearned income (Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990); (4) inherited assets 
(Quisumbing 1994); (5) assets at marriage (Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997); 
and (6) current assets (Doss 1996). 
                                                 
14The value of kin support is illustrated by Bangladeshi sisters’ giving up their share of land inheritance in 
return for their brothers’ support (Subramanian 1998). The assurance of their brothers’ support clearly has 
an economic value for these women. 
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 Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) examine the effect of a policy that effectively 
transferred the child allowance from men to women in the United Kingdom in the late 
1970s. They find that it increases the share of expenditures on women’s clothing and 
children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing. Hoddinott and Haddad’s (1994, 1995) 
work on Côte d’Ivoire investigates the effect of women’s income share on the allocation 
of expenditures. Recognizing the endogeneity of women’s income share, they use the 
difference in the educational attainment of the head and spouse, the proportion of 
landholdings and household business capital operated by adult women, the ratio of the 
spouse to the male head’s education, and other dummy variables related to wife’s 
schooling as instruments for the share of women’s income. Thomas (1990) and Schultz 
(1990) use unearned income: Thomas (1990) tests the collective model by examining the 
effects of unearned income of men and women on nutrient intakes, fertility and child 
survival, and child anthropometrics, while Schultz analyzes the differential effects of 
men’s and women’s unearned income on labor supply and fertility in Thailand. 
Quisumbing (1994) examines the intrahousehold distribution of land and education as a 
function of father’s and mother’s education and inherited landholdings in the Philippines. 
Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) examine whether assets brought to marriage 
by husband and wife have a differential impact on child health in Indonesia. Finally, Doss 
(1996) examines the effects of current assets on the distribution of expenditure among 
different consumption categories in Ghana. 
 None of these measures is perfect. Labor income, which has often been included 
in computations of income shares (e.g., Kennedy 1992), is clearly problematic because it  20 
   
reflects time allocation and labor force participation decisions. Several studies (e.g., 
Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990) use nonlabor income (also called unearned income or 
nonwage income), either directly, or as an instrument for total income (Thomas 1993). 
Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) assume that nonearned income is independent of 
tastes and labor market conditions, which may not be true if much of nonearned income 
is from pensions, unemployment benefits, and earnings from assets accumulated over the 
life cycle. However, these concerns may be less critical in studies that focus on children 
(and households early in the life cycle) and in those that rely on measures of wealth that 
are typically inherited or given at the time of marriage (Strauss and Thomas 1995). 
 Current asset holdings, used by Doss (1996) in her study of Ghanaian households, 
may also be affected by asset accumulation decisions made within marriage.
15  
Depending on provisions of marriage laws, assets acquired within marriage may be 
considered joint property and will not be easily assignable to husband or wife. The 
validity of inherited assets as an indicator of bargaining power may be conditional upon 
the receipt of these assets prior to marriage, unless bargaining power also depends on the 
expected value of inheritance.
16   Inherited assets could also be correlated with individual 
unobservables, such as previous investments in the individual during childhood (Strauss 
and Thomas 1995). Finally, assets brought to marriage, while exogenous to decisions 
                                                 
15One of her sensitivity tests uses a specification with the percentage of land owned by women, but 
landownership by women in Ghana may be endogenous to marriage. In Western Ghana, Quisumbing et al. 
(1998) show that women obtain strong individualized land rights, equivalent to private ownership, from 
their husbands if they help in establishing cocoa fields. Husbands “give” their wives land to circumvent 
traditional inheritance practices among the matrilineal Akan. 
16Admittedly, a potential heir could exert much power within his or her household, but the threat of 
disinheritance does exist.  21 
   
made within marriage, could be affected by assortative mating and marriage market 
selection (Foster 1996).  
 Finding the appropriate indicator of bargaining power should be guided not only 
by the need to find a variable that is exogenous to bargaining occurring within marriage, 
but more importantly by the cultural relevance of these indicators. Increasingly, 
economists are turning to ethnographic evidence and qualitative methods used by 
sociologists and anthropologists to guide the construction of appropriate measures of 
bargaining power.
17  Based on anthropological evidence from the rural Philippines, 
Quisumbing (1994) argues that inherited landholdings are a valid measure of bargaining 
power since land is usually given as part of the marriage gift and major asset transfers 
occur at the time of marriage. Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) used 
ethnographic evidence and focus-group discussions in Indonesia to identify areas where 
women bring substantial asset holdings to marriage, and where they can claim these 
assets upon divorce. Noting that if male or female “income” is measured with error, 
estimated income effects will be biased, Frankenberg and Thomas (1998) investigate the 
possible biases from reporting spouse’s assets by interviewing husbands and wives 
separately and comparing their responses in the Indonesian Family Life Survey. 
However, assets controlled by the couple may not be the only relevant variable. In 
societies where the extended family is a key player in intrahousehold allocation, such as 
                                                 
17See, for example, Rao’s (1997) analysis of wife-beating in South India, which uses a combination of 
qualitative and econometric methods.  22 
   
those in South Asia, characteristics of the extended family may affect intrahousehold 
allocation outcomes.
18   
 
4. THE IMPACT OF MALE AND FEMALE PHYSICAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
ON INTRAHOUSEHOLD OUTCOMES 
 This paper uses new data from four household surveys to test whether assets 
brought to marriage by each spouse have differential effects on intrahousehold allocation 
outcomes. In this paper, we focus on two types of outcomes:  household-level outcomes, 
and individual level outcomes. The household-level outcomes are expenditure shares of 
food, education, health, children’s clothing, and, where applicable, alcohol and/or 
tobacco. The latter have frequently been used as “adult goods” in outlay equivalent 
analyses (Deaton 1989, Haddad and Reardon 1993). The individual-level outcomes 
analyzed are two measures of educational attainment:  the deviation of the child’s 
completed schooling from the cohort mean, and years of schooling completed. The 
analysis of both household-level and related individual-level outcomes is similar to Doss 
(1997), who examines the effect of current assets on expenditure shares and health and 
education outcomes in Ghana. 
 Assets at marriage are an attractive indicator of bargaining power for several 
reasons. From the economist’s perspective, assets brought to marriage are exogenous to 
decisions made within marriage, even if they are endogenous due to marriage market 
                                                 
18In Bangladesh, for example, where related households (the bari) typically live around a common yard, 
landownership and education of the head in origin households affect educational attainment of children in 
partitioned households (Foster 1993).  23 
   
selection. Second, in many cultures, marriage is one of two key occasions when assets are 
transferred during an individual’s lifetime (the other is death). Third, assets transferred at 
marriage may have a symbolic meaning over and above their economic value. Guyer 
(1997: 123) argues that assets are imbued with value through cultural processes that are 
“much larger than the household or family, extending over much larger frames than the 
life cycle.”  Recognizing the cultural specificity of asset transfers and marriage customs, 
the authors and their collaborators designed and pretested survey modules on assets and 
related transfers at marriage in each of the study countries. In most of the countries, the 
household survey was informed by a qualitative study (Bangladesh, Ethiopia, South 
Africa) or by community interviews on marriage customs and transfers at the time of 
marriage (Sumatra). Using a broad definition of assets at marriage to include human 
capital, we can treat the educational attainment of each spouse as a proxy for the human 
capital they each bring to the marriage. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 To test our model using household-level outcomes, we estimate the following 
expenditure function: 
 
 wj = aj + b1j lnpcexp + b2j ( lnpcexp)
2 + b3j   lnsize + b4j lnAh + b5j lnAw 
 + S
K-1
k=1 dkj demk + S
S
s=1  jsj zs + ej , (13) 
where 
 wj is the budget share of the jth good;  24 
   
 lnpcexp is the natural logarithm of total per capita expenditures, and  
 (lnpcexp)
2 is its square; 
 lnsize is the natural log of household size; 
 lnAh and lnAw are the natural logs of assets owned by the husband and wife, 
respectively; 
 demk is the proportion of demographic group k in the household; and  
 zs is a vector of dummy variables indicating location and survey 
round; 
 ej is the error term; and 
 aj,  b1j, b2j, b3j, b4j, dkj, and  jsj  are parameters to be estimated. We include the square of 
ln per capita expenditure so that any observed differences in the effects of individual 
assets would not be simply picking up nonlinearities in the Engel curve (Thomas and 
Chen 1994). Controlling for levels of household income (as proxied by per capita 
expenditure), if the unitary model holds in a static framework, assets of husband and wife 
should have no effect on allocations so  b4j = b5j = 0. In a more general (e.g., dynamic) 
framework, however, the equality of husband’s and wife’s effects to zero may not hold. 
We therefore use a more general version of the test of the unitary model, namely that the 
difference between the husband’s and wife’s asset effects is equal to zero. 
 While we could have included husband’s and wife’s human capital as regressors 
in the expenditure regressions, schooling would have been highly correlated with per  25 
   
capita expenditures. In this version of the paper, for comparability with other estimates of 
expenditure functions, we do not include husband’s and wife’s education as regressors.
19 
 We use a slightly different formulation for testing the effects of husband’s and 
wife’s resources on individual outcomes. Following Thomas (1990,1994, 1996a) and 
Quisumbing (1994), we estimate the child’s schooling outcome as a function of child 
characteristics (gender, age, and age squared) and parental characteristics at the time of 
marriage: education of the husband and wife, and assets at marriage of the husband and 








ij is the educational outcome of child i in family j; Xc is a vector of child 
characteristics such as sex, age, and age squared; G is the daughter dummy, and Xf and 
Xm are vectors of exogenous father’s and mother’s human and physical wealth, 
respectively, and eij is the error term in each equation. Following some tests of the unitary 
model, which include both human and physical capital as assets brought to marriage, 
father’s and mother’s wealth at the time of marriage enter separately into the regressions. 
 Equation (14) is estimated both in levels and with family fixed effects. It is 
possible that omitted family-level variables are correlated with regressors, and thus their 
estimated effects on the educational outcomes may be biased. For those families with at 
least two children, the within family allocation can be used as the source of variation in 
                                                 
19We do include husband’s and wife’s education in the instrument set for the Bangladesh regressions. 
  26 
   
the sample from which to estimate intrahousehold differences.
20  A fixed effects 
estimation procedure controls for these unobservables using family-specific dummy 
variables. In this specific application, only the child's sex, age, age squared, and the 
interaction between child sex and parent characteristics remain as explanatory variables. 
While the effects of variables that do not vary across children cannot be identified, their 
gender implications may be investigated to the extent that they impact differently on 
children of different sex. On the other hand, if educational outcomes were affected by 
individual heterogeneity, a random effects procedure would be appropriate. A Lagrange 
multiplier statistic tests for the appropriateness of the random effects model compared to 
ordinary least squares (OLS) without group effects, while a Hausman test compares the 
random effects model to a fixed-effects specification.  
 We first present the results for the expenditure regressions for all four countries, 
then turn to the individual education results. 
 
DATA AND RESULTS OF EXPENDITURE REGRESSIONS  
Bangladesh
21 
 Similar to other countries in South Asia, Bangladeshi society is dominated by a 
patrilineal and patrilocal kinship system. Islamic law, which applies to 85 percent of the 
population, allows women to own property. However, situations of benami, where 
                                                 
20Families with at least two children are included so that sex dummies are relevant in the family fixed 
effects specification. The fixed effects procedure eliminates selectivity bias since family size, which affects 
selection into the sample, is a family-specific variable. 
 
21This draws heavily on Quisumbing and de la Brière (1999). 
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husbands acquire properties in their wives’ name, and naior, where daughters are 
encouraged to relinquish their rightful claims to inheritance to their brothers, illustrate 
limitations that rural women face in trying to exercise their property rights (Subramanian 
1998). 
 Our data come from 47 villages in three sites in Bangladesh, each site chosen as 
part of an impact evaluation of programs disseminating new agricultural technologies 
(IFPRI-BIDS-INFS 1998). In two sites (Saturia and Jessore), technologies are being 
introduced through NGO programs targeted exclusively to women, who are provided 
training and credit. At the third site (Mymensingh), project and Department of Fisheries 
extension agents provide training to relatively better-off households and training with 
credit to relatively poorer households, directed at both men and women, but men more 
often than women. The four-round survey collected information on production and other 
income earning activities by individual family member, expenditures on various food, 
health, and other items at the household level, food and nutrient intakes by individual 
family member, time allocation patterns, and health and nutritional status by individual 
family member. In the second round, information on parental and sibling background was 
also collected for both the husband and wife. 
 Between the second and third survey rounds, a parallel study using qualitative 
methods was also conducted in a pair of villages in each of the three sites to elicit group 
members' views on the effects of the NGOs and the new technologies on incomes, 
education and health of children, women's status and empowerment, among others 
(Naved 1997). We drew from the results of the qualitative study to formulate  28 
   
questionnaire modules on premarriage assets, transfers at marriage, inheritance, and 
indicators of women's mobility and empowerment.  
 We restrict the following analysis to the monogamous households where both 
husband and wife are present and no change in household structure or marital status 
happened during the four survey rounds (divorce, separation, death of a member, second 
marriage).
22  Our sample of intact couples with complete assets information consists of 
826 households, of which 29 percent are three-generation households. 
 In the fourth survey round, respondents were asked to recall the assets they owned 
before their wedding (land, cattle, “durables”—jewelry, clothes, and household 
utensils—for both husband and wife, and in addition, houses for men and food items for 
women).
23 Both male and female respondents also provided information about their 
premarital occupation and experience in farming, wage labor, or other business activities. 
In addition, they had to compare the wealth of their family and their future spouse's 
family at the time of wedding (results not reported). 
 Female premarital assets are much less valuable than male (Table 1). They most 
often consist of food and durables.
24 In addition, a specific module about transfers at 
marriage was administered to the female respondents. Asset categories for these modules 
                                                 
22This obviously does not address issues of household formation and dissolution (Foster and Rosenzweig 
1998), nor the possibility that intact couples are those where bargaining has been "successful." We do not 
deal with the sample selection biases introduced by analyzing only intact couples. While we attempted to 
construct a similar set of variables for deceased, absent, or divorced spouses by recall, these measures are 
less reliable than those collected for "intact" couples.  
23This information was complimented with the data on inherited assets. When inheritance happened prior to 
the marriage, these assets were added to the premarriage assets if not reported in the corresponding module. 
24A bride will typically bring stores of grain and other food items with her when she moves to her in-laws’ 
compound.  29 
   
were complemented by specific questions about jewelry (nose pin) and cash (shelami) 
exchanges at the moment of the wedding. These specific assets were suggested by the 
qualitative analysis. The transfers to the bride and groom were computed by summing up 
all transfers to each individual and assigning to each individual half of the transfers 
reported "to the couple." 
 Data presented in Table 1 point to larger transfers to the bride at the time of 
marriage. Since only the wife was interviewed about these transfers, she might not have 
known about all transfers from her family to her husband's family.
25  For earlier 
marriages, recall bias and asset valuation might also lead to measurement errors. For the 
present analysis, we included those transfers that are comparable to the previous asset 
categories as well as cash (excluding transportation costs and food costs).
26  These data 
show a net asset transfer to the wife's side, although the most recent weddings exhibit a 
net transfer to the groom. The data are thus consistent with the shift to dowry reported in 
the qualitative survey,
27 although the shift occurs quite late in the 1980s, which might be 
attributed to underreporting. In no case are the transfers at marriage enough to 
compensate the wives for the value of the cattle and house owned by their prospective 
husbands.  
                                                 
25We administered the module on transfers at marriage only to wives, to avoid overloading the male 
respondents' questionnaire. The wife was asked about five categories of transfers:  to the bride, to the 
groom, to the couple jointly, to the bride's family, and to the groom's family. The practice of interviewing 
only the wife about transfers at marriage is consistent with work by Rao (1997), who suggests that women 
often have better recall of these transfers, since marriage is the most important event at which assets are 
transferred to women. (Men, on the other hand, may receive sizable transfers at the death of a parent.) 
26This definition is consistent with that of Bloch and Rao (1996), who define dowry as a groom-price, a 
payment in cash and/or kind directly made from a bride’s family to a groom’s.  
27This phenomenon is also largely reported in India (see Rao 1997 and Bloch and Rao 1996 for references).  30 
   
 Given that parental characteristics significantly affect the assets brought to a 
marriage by the couple, and that education and wealth may affect total expenditure, 
estimating an expenditure share equation without accounting for potential endogeneity of 
regressors would lead to biased estimates. We thus employ a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) procedure using instruments suggested by the previous analysis. For assets at 
marriage, we use husband’s and wife’s education, age, age squared, birth order, number 
of siblings, and number of living brothers; husband’s and wife’s families’ landholdings, 
and indicators of the educational attainment of their parents as instruments. Many of 
these instruments would also affect total expenditure and household size; for additional 
instruments, we include the lagged (first round) values of the ln of per capita expenditure 
and its square, and ln household size.
28  We thus perform the regressions only on the 
second to fourth round data.
29 Instrumentation may also help us deal with measurement 
error, particularly in the asset measures. 
 We present the complete results for the 2SLS regressions with assets at marriage 
in Table 2. Most of the expenditure coefficients, while of the expected signs, are 
insignificant, with the exception of health expenditures. The coefficients on the 
demographic composition variables are as expected, and illustrate the discrimination 
against females in Bangladeshi society. Relative to adult males (the excluded category), 
an increased proportion of adult females and female preschoolers in the household reduce 
                                                 
28In the first stage regressions, the F-test statistics on the exclusion restrictions for the instruments were as 
follows: Ln per capita expenditure = 22.58; Ln per capita expenditure squared = 21.02; Ln household size = 
13.54; Ln husband's assets at marriage = 7.47 ; and Ln wife’s assets at marriage = 22.27; all with a p-value 
of [0.000]. 
29According to the survey design, the first and the fourth rounds were conducted at a year’s interval, so 
expenditure patterns in the fourth round are expected to be very similar to that in the first round.   31 
   
the food expenditure share. The presence of elderly females also reduces the share of 
expenditures on health. The presence of children of all age groups increases the share 
spent on child clothing, and the share of children between 10-19 years of age increases 
the share of household expenditures on education. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on 
males 10-19 in the education equation is twice the size of the female coefficient. Clearly, 
male children are favored with respect to education. 
 Our results also reject the null hypothesis that a unitary model of the household 
operates in rural Bangladesh. Even in a patriarchal society where husbands control most 
of the household’s resources, when household expenditure is controlled for, coefficients 
on husband’s and wife’s assets are significantly different from each other in the health 
and education regressions (F-tests reported on the second line from the bottom of Table 2). 
 Women's assets at marriage have a positive and significant effect on children's 
clothing and educational expenditures, and a negative effect on health expenditures. The 
results for children’s clothing and education are consistent with most of the empirical 
evidence on the positive and significant effect of women’s incomes on investments in 
children (e.g., Doss 1996; Thomas and Chen 1994). In societies where a woman’s ability 
to accumulate assets is proscribed, children are probably her most important investment 
and insurance for the future. However, the negative effect on health should probably be 
taken with caution, since we do not take into account the possibility that a wealthier 
woman might be more likely to have healthier children, and thus lower expenditures on 
health. 
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Indonesia 
 In contrast to Bangladesh, our study site in Indonesia is characterized by 
matrilineal inheritance and matrilocal residence. The survey site is in West Sumatra, 
where communal land tenure is evolving toward individualized ownership, and 
commercial tree plots have been actively developed in the buffer zone of the Kerinci 
Seblat National Park. In this region, land has traditionally been bequeathed from a mother 
to her daughters, and joint ownership of paddy fields by lineage members (consisting 
typically of three generations descended from the same grandmother) or by sisters also 
has been common. Paddy lands are traditionally inherited by women, supposedly to 
ensure the family’s food security. For commercial tree crops, such as rubber, cinnamon, 
and coffee, the trend has been towards more individualized tenure and ownership of 
agroforestry land and bush fallow areas by males (Quisumbing and Otsuka 1998).  
 We conducted a retrospective survey of inheritance and education in two villages 
in the Middle and Low Regions of West Sumatra (see Suyanto, Tomich, and Otsuka 
1998a and 1998b for a detailed description of the study site).
30  The respondents were 
asked about premarriage wealth (education and landownership) of their parents and in-
laws, the education and inheritance of their spouses, and schooling and proposed bequests 
to their children. Each respondent was also asked to list all of his or her siblings, their 
dates of birth, their educational attainment, and the areas of paddy land, agroforestry 
land, and bush-fallow land that they received or expected to receive from their parents. In 
many cases, respondents received land at marriage, but stood to inherit more land after 
                                                 
30The retrospective survey on inheritance was patterned after a similar survey in the Philippines 
(Quisumbing 1994).  33 
   
their parents' death. We use the data on land areas received at marriage in our 
regressions.
31  Because land rights differ significantly by gender across paddy land and 
agroforestry lands in West Sumatra, we included two categories of land in our 
regressions:  paddy land (traditionally inherited by women), and forestry land (the sum of 
agroforestry and bush-fallow land). Table 1 shows that women receive slightly more 
paddy land than their husbands, who, in turn, have more forest landholdings at marriage. 
Wives, however, have slightly lower educational attainment than their husbands. (We 
also estimated these regressions with the sum of total landholdings for each spouse. 
Aggregating land categories does not enable us to reject the null hypothesis that 
coefficients on husband’s and wife’s land are equal. We return to the implications of 
asset aggregation in the summary.) 
 Regressions on expenditure shares for food, health, education, children’s clothing, 
and tobacco are presented in Table 3. Because some expenditure categories are censored, 
we estimated the expenditure share regressions using tobits; these results do not control 
for the endogeneity of total expenditures nor of household size. While the expenditure 
coefficients are of the expected signs, they are significant only in the education, child 
clothing, and tobacco regressions. In contrast to the Bangladeshi case, discrimination 
against females cannot be discerned from the coefficients on demographic categories. 
This is consistent with the egalitarian cultural values of Indonesian society. 
                                                 
31We also included a module on transfers at marriage, but we have not analyzed these data yet. Since land 
is the major asset transferred at marriage in these societies, the bias due to using data on land alone is 
unlikely to be large.   34 
   
 The results also lead to a rejection of the unitary model. Husband’s paddy land 
has a negative effect on the food expenditure share, and the effect of husband’s paddy 
land is significantly different from that of the wife’s. Wife’s paddy land has a significant 
and positive effect on the health expenditure share; again this coefficient is significantly 
different from the husband’s. Husband’s forestry land has a negative effect on 
expenditure shares on education, counteracted by the positive effect of wife’s paddy land. 
This may reflect the increase in the opportunity cost of schooling due to larger holdings 
of forestry land, which require substantial labor input from family members to be 
productive (Quisumbing and Otsuka 1998). Finally, husband’s paddy land has a positive 
and significant effect on expenditure shares on tobacco, a coefficient that is significantly 
different from the coefficient on wife’s paddy land. 
 
Ethiopia 
 Ethiopia ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world, in part a reflection of 
its tumultuous recent history. Over the past decade it has seen drought, famine, civil war, 
and the demise of a military government leading to a number of policy reversals.
32 As the 
second most populous country in Africa, the people of Ethiopia are characterized by 
substantial ethnic and religious diversity; there are over 85 ethnic groups and most major 
world and animist religions are represented (Webb and von Braun 1994). For example, 
the anthropological evidence suggests that as one moves from north to south in Ethiopia, 
                                                 
32In 1991, a coalition of opposing guerilla forces, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) defeated the communist-led Derg regime, which had been in power for 17 years. In addition, the 
30-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea ceased in 1993 when Ethiopia recognized Eritrean independence, 
though it began again this year.  35 
   
women's status, and therefore possibly their bargaining power, declines. This diversity 
extends beyond the people and culture of Ethiopia to their environment since the 
agroecological zones, and consequently, farming systems vary dramatically around the 
country.  
The 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) surveyed approximately 
1,500 households in 15 villages all across Ethiopia, thus capturing some of the diversity 
described above.
33 While sample households within villages were randomly selected, the 
choice of the villages themselves was purposive to ensure that the major farming systems 
were represented. As such, the sample is not representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole. 
Reported expenditures (including imputed values for home produced items) on 
approximately 200 items have been aggregated and adjusted for different recall periods in 
order to calculate total expenditures and expenditure shares. Average per capita 
expenditures in the sample exceed 1,100 birr ($160) per annum, about 20 percent above 
the national average for 1997. Consistent with the relative poverty of Ethiopia, 
households spend, on average, three-quarters of their budget on food; much smaller 
percentages are spent on the other expenditure categories (See Table 4, bottom row). This 
has at least two important implications for the analysis discussed further below: (1) many 
households report zero expenditures for nonfood items; (2) the amount of "discretionary" 
spending beyond food is often rather small, possibly limiting the space over which 
bargaining might take place.  
                                                 
33The 1997 ERHS was undertaken by the Department of Economics, Addis Ababa University (AAU), in 
collaboration with IFPRI and the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), Oxford University. 
The 1997 survey built on a panel survey conducted by AAU and CSAE in 1994/95 but these earlier rounds 
are not used in the present analysis.  36 
   
In addition to the detailed demographic and expenditure information, the survey 
collected information from ever married individuals regarding their circumstances at the 
time of marriage (e.g., age, education, experience, family background, and assets) as well 
as the circumstances surrounding the marriage itself (e.g., type of marriage contract used, 
if any; decisionmaker regarding the choice of a spouse, etc.). While a variety of assets 
brought to the marriage, and transfers made at the time of the marriage, were recorded, 
this analysis focuses on the value of the two most important assets in the rural Ethiopian 
economy, land and livestock. This is done both to minimize recall error surrounding 
typically smaller and less important items and exchanges and because these more 
permanent assets (contrasted with, say food brought to the newlywed’s home) are likely 
to be better proxies for bargaining power. The value of assets at the time of marriage is 
inflated to current value based on the date of marriage and a consumer price index. Given 
the difficulties inherent in a long recall period and choice of inflation factor for these 
items, it is hard to measure premarital assets precisely and these values are likely to be 
measured with error. Nonetheless patterns emerge; we see that, on average, men bring 
substantially more physical (and human) capital to the marriage than do women (see 
Table 1). 
For the econometric analysis, the main two statistical problems described above 
are measurement error in husband’s and wife’s assets and the high degree of censoring 
for nonfood expenditure categories. Given the emphasis of this research on the novel 
measures of assets at marriage as indicators of bargaining power, this research uses two-
stage least squares in order to address the first problem. Both husband’s and wife’s assets  37 
   
are treated as endogenous and predicted using measures of parental education and the 
value of gifts transferred from the groom’s to the bride’s family at the time of the 
marriage and vice versa.
34 To reiterate, the main purpose for these instruments is to 
control for random measurement error; they are not intended to control for potential 
endogeneity due to, for example, selective matching in the marriage market. 
The expenditure share regressions reported in Table 4 conform to typical patterns 
in the literature. Food shares decline with total per capita expenditures while the other 
reported categories increase with expenditures, although at a decreasing rate. The 
influence of demographic structure, where significant, is plausible. For example, having 
more boys or girls under age 5 (relative to adult men and holding household size 
constant) who are not yet of school age decreases the shares spent on education and child 
clothing. 
During the past few decades, drought, war, and government policy have all 
contributed to resettlement and migration in Ethiopia. Therefore, while ethnicity is in part 
tied to location, the overlap is incomplete and it is important to control for both in any 
analysis. As a result, after controlling for each village with village indicators, controls for 
ethnicity are only occasionally significant, though they remain consistent with the 
ethnographic literature that describes women's status as relatively higher in the north, 
where the Tigreans typically reside. This is borne out by, for example, the negative 
coefficients on the ethnic indicator variables (relative to Tigray) for child clothing and the 
                                                 
34In the first-stage equation for husband’s assets the F-test on the exclusion restriction for the instruments is 
F(6,1378) =3.1 with p-value [0.005], and for wife’s assets, F(6,1378) = 2.6 with p-value [0.015].  38 
   
positive (and jointly significant) ones for alcohol and tobacco, which are consumed 
mostly by men. 
After controlling for village, ethnic, and religious variation, the effects of assets 
brought to marriage by the husband or the wife are significantly different for food and for 
alcohol and tobacco. More assets in the hands of wives (relative to husbands) increase the 
food budget share (see F-test of the equality of coefficients on husband's versus wife's 
assets, third row from the bottom). In contrast, more assets in the hands of husbands 
(relative to wives) increases the share spent on alcohol and tobacco, goods typically 
consumed by men. If one excludes the village, ethnic, and religious controls, however, 
the differences are stronger and also significant for the health shares as well (not shown). 
On balance, the evidence suggests that despite the relatively high fraction of the budget 
spent on food, there is bargaining over how resources are allocated, and that it varies both 
within and between communities and ethnic groups. 
Unlike the other countries in this study, there is no apparent impact of the 
premarital assets on education expenditure shares. Indeed the point estimates of the 
effects of husband’s and wife’s assets on education shares, while insignificant, have the 
same sign and magnitude. Whether this result extends to educational outcomes 
themselves is explored below. 
 
South Africa 
Despite the fact that South Africa is considered an upper-middle income country 
with 1997 per capita GNP of approximately $3,000, it is a highly unequal society and the  39 
   
majority of the population lives in poverty (Carter and May 1998). Over the past decade, 
the country has faced a number of dramatic changes in the political, social, and economic 
environment as many of the policies underlying apartheid, for example, restrictions on 
mobility and residential location, are dismantled. At the same time, a new constitution 
puts gender equality firmly on the agenda; as such it is an interesting, albeit complicated, 
setting in which to analyze bargaining models. 
The first South African national household survey, the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development (PSLSD), was undertaken in the last half of 1993 by 
a consortium of South African survey groups and universities under the leadership of the 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of 
Cape Town with financial and technical support from the World Bank [PSLSD 1994]. 
KwaZulu-Natal Province, on the east coast, was resurveyed from March to June, 1998.
35 
Formed by combining the former Zulu homeland and the former Natal province, 
KwaZulu-Natal is now South Africa's largest province, containing one-fifth of a 
population of approximately 40 million. Though not the poorest province, it is relatively 
poor despite being relatively urban (35 percent). Three-quarters of its people are 
African,
36 and nearly all of these Zulu, 14 percent Indian, 7 percent white, and 3 percent 
colored. During the mid 1980s and again in the early 1990s, there was substantial 
political unrest and violence in KwaZulu-Natal. 
                                                 
35The 1998 re-survey examined here was directed by a consortium comprised of the University of Natal, 
the University of Wisconsin, and the International Food Policy Research Institute. 
36“African” here excludes the “colored,” Indian (or Asian), and white populations.  40 
   
In 1993, the Kwazulu-Natal sample was representative at the province level, 
conditional on the accuracy of the sampling frame. White and colored households were 
not resurveyed in 1998. The analysis presented here uses only the 1998 data and includes 
Africans and Indians in both rural and urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal Province. Thus it is 
unique among the countries in this study, since it includes residents of urban areas. 
Africans and Indians are both economically and culturally different and this will be 
controlled for in the analysis. For example, annual per capita expenditures for Africans 
average just under $500, while for Indians they are nearly four times as large. 
Consequently food shares are also quite large, with Africans spending over 50 percent of 
their budget on food, while Indians spend about one-third. 
For couples, information was collected on whether or not each partner owned a 
variety of assets before marriage, including cattle, other livestock, land, a house, and 
jewelry, among other things. The logarithm of a simple count of the number of assets 
owned by each partner is used as a proxy for assets owned at marriage (see Table 1). 
While this measure obviates the need for respondents to impute values of items owned in 
the distant past, it suffers from the same concerns for assets at marriage described in 
detail above, i.e., it is imprecise. Once again, the analytic strategy to deal with this 
imprecision is instrumental variables. 
Fewer than half the households in the sample had an intact couple coresiding, an 
issue to which we return below. Ethnographic evidence regarding relations between men 
and women for Africans and Indians indicate that they are very different, starting with the 
forms that marriage contracts take. For example, the traditional marriage agreement for  41 
   
Zulus involves a payment, lobola, made from the groom and his family to the bride’s 
family, usually before the couple can marry. For Indians, the more common scenario is 
the reverse, or dowry, with the majority of payments being made from the bride’s to the 
groom’s family. The expenditure share regressions presented in Table 5 control for 
community-level fixed effects. In addition, to allow differential effects by race, an Indian 
dummy variable is interacted with the measures of assets at marriage (due to 
segregation—Africans and Indians live in different communities, an Indian dummy 
variable is not needed). The regressions are estimated using two-stage least squares with 
measures of husband’s and wife’s assets, and their interactions with an Indian dummy 
variable, treated as endogenous. The instrumental variables include measures of gifts 
exchanged between families at marriage and lobola payments, parental education, and 
indicators of whether parents were alive at the time of marriage.
37 
The expenditure share regressions are reported in Table 5. On the whole, the two-
stage least squares estimates are rather imprecise; indeed, while the set of cluster 
dummies are highly significant in each of the models, all the other regressors are not even 
jointly significant for health. Only in the case of education is there a significant 
difference between the assets for African husbands and wives; more resources brought to 
the marriage by the wife relative to the husband increase the share of the budget spent on 
education. This is not true for Indians, however, and there is no difference. 
                                                 
37In the first-stage equation for husband’s assets the F-test on the exclusion restriction for the instruments is 
F(12, 475) =2.4 with p-value [0.005] and is the same for wife’s assets. For the first-stage equation of 
husband’s assets interacted with Indian the F-test is F(12, 475) = 1.9 with p-value [0.039] and for wife’s 
F(12, 475) = 1.2 with p-value[0.289].  42 
   
With the two-stage least squares methodology, it is unlikely that the results are 
being driven by measurement errors alone, for example, due to coefficients on the asset 
measures being biased toward zero “favoring” the unitary model. However, it is possible 
that the complexity of households in South Africa contributes to the results that on the 
whole fail to reject the hypotheses of the unitary model. Over half the households in the 
sample (of 1,219) do not have a couple coresiding and are thus excluded from the 
analysis. This in part reflects the history of the South African economy that relied to a 
large extent on male migrant labor (to the urban areas and mines) and has left a legacy of 
partners not coresiding. Selection into this subsample may be influencing the results: 
couples who had more conflict over bargaining may no longer be coresiding. 
Moreover, even for those households with a couple present, there are often other 
adults who may also be key decisionmakers. For example, over half the households in the 
sample have four or more adults. Analyses such as this, which ignore these complexities, 
may not have a lot of power to determine whether a unitary model is a poor description of 
reality. These sorts of problems further the need to focus in on more individual-level 
outcomes, such as education, and to include household fixed effects that can control in 
part for the selectivity described here. 
 
INDIVIDUAL EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 
Across the four countries, the most consistent effect is that relative resources 
controlled by women tend to increase the shares spent on education (in all countries but 
Ethiopia). However, the household-level analysis does not reveal who within the  43 
   
household benefits from the increased allocation of resources towards education. Since 
the data sets provide more reliable information on coresident children (in some data sets, 
information was also collected on nonresident children), it is likely that schooling 
decisions of these children are not yet complete. To take into account incomplete 
schooling decisions, we use two individual-level outcomes:  (1) the deviation of each 
child’s completed years of schooling from the cohort mean; and (2) actual years of 
completed schooling, controlling for child age. In the first specification, we are 
measuring how well each child is doing relative to other children of the same age. In the 
second, we control for the correlation between age and schooling completion by 
including linear and quadratic terms in child age. While it could be argued that both 
measures are capturing the same phenomenon, an advantage of the deviation from cohort 
mean is that it is not prone to censoring, unlike schooling attainment, which could be 
censored at zero in countries where many children have never attended school. To test 
whether family-specific unobservables or individual heterogeneity are important, we 
estimated both fixed- and random-effects estimates; since the Hausman test shows that 
the fixed-effects estimates are preferred in most specifications, only these results are 




Educational outcomes are estimated for two groups of coresident children:  
children 6-10 years of age, and children 11-15 years. Early marriage, particularly of girls, 
                                                 
38The exception is Sumatra, where the Hausman test does not suggest that fixed effects are important. In 
Bangladesh, we only weakly reject random effects in favor of fixed effects.  44 
   
may create sample selectivity bias, since girls who marry tend to leave both school and 
their parents’ residence. We attempt to minimize the effect of selection bias by restricting 
the sample to children 15 and under. Regression results for both outcomes and age groups 
are presented in Table 6. 
For children between 6 and 10 years of age, examining the levels results, mother’s 
and father’s schooling have positive and significant effects on the child’s deviation from 
the cohort mean. Assets at marriage are insignificant, and none of the interaction terms 
with the daughter dummy are significant for the younger age group. While there seem to 
be no significant differences between father’s and mother’s schooling when only the 
coefficients of the schooling terms are considered, when interactions with child gender 
are accounted for, the total effect of father’s schooling differs significantly from mother’s 
schooling. When we control for family-level unobservables, higher educational 
attainment of fathers does not benefit daughters relative to sons. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms between the daughter dummy and parental education are significantly 
different for fathers and mothers.  
Parental gender preference appears to be stronger for the older age group. In the 
levels estimates, sons with better-educated fathers, and daughters with better-educated 
mothers, seem to do better relative to other children of the same age. The effects of 
father’s and mother’s education, taking into account gender interactions, are significantly 
different from each other. When family-level unobservables are considered, the 
interaction of father’s assets with the daughter dummy is negative and significant, 
indicating that wealthier fathers tend to favor sons, relative to daughters. The positive  45 
   
(but weakly significant) coefficient on the daughter dummy in the older age group is a 
surprising result, which may reflect sample selectivity (coresident daughters are likely to 
have never been married so are still in school) or the effect of scholarship programs 
designed to keep girls in school. Arends-Kuenning and Amin (1998) have suggested that 
scholarship programs targeting girls have seemed to succeed in raising age at marriage 
and increasing school attendance; however, boys have reduced time spent in school in 
favor of wage work. This result deserves further investigation. 
Results for regressions on completed years of schooling are similar. Since about 
30 percent of children have never attended school, the regression on years of schooling is 
estimated as a tobit. As expected, age and age squared terms are significant. For the 
levels estimates, mother’s schooling has a positive and significant coefficient for the 
younger age group; both father’s and mother’s schooling coefficients are significant for 
the older children. While the interaction terms do not indicate any parental gender 
preference for the younger children, older daughters of better-educated fathers complete 
fewer years in school. This may be linked to the South Asian pattern of wealthier families 
withdrawing females from public life, or from wealthier parents’ desire for their 
daughters to marry early. In this society, wealthier fathers would be able to accumulate a 
dowry sooner than poorer fathers.  
We also estimate this regression using fixed effects; however, given that the 
dependent variable is censored, future work will employ an estimator that yields 
consistent estimates with both censoring and fixed effects. The fixed effects results show 
that when family level unobservables are controlled for, clear patterns of gender  46 
   
preference emerge. For the younger age group, daughters of better-educated fathers, and 
daughters of wealthier fathers, complete fewer years of schooling than their brothers. 
Better-educated mothers do seem to favor daughters in schooling, counteracting the effect 
of father’s education and assets. For the older age group, the fixed effects results show 
that daughters of wealthier fathers do less well than sons. 
Tests of the coefficients show that the main effects of father’s and mother’s 
schooling differ significantly from each other, while asset effects are statistically 
indistinguishable. For the younger children, taking into account interactions with child 
gender, the effects of mother’s education differ significantly from father’s. When family 
level unobservables are considered, for the younger children, we reject the null 




We estimate similar regressions on deviations from the cohort mean and 
completed years of schooling for Indonesia (Table 7). Unlike the Bangladesh case, small 
sample sizes prevent us from stratifying the sample by age. One advantage of the 
Indonesia data set, however, is that information on completed schooling was collected for 
all children of the household head, regardless of their current place of residence. 
Similar to the results for the expenditure share regressions, we find that, in the 
levels estimates, mother’s paddy land has a positive and significant coefficient. This 
coefficient is significantly different from that on father’s schooling. While individual  47 
   
coefficients are insignificant, coefficients on forestland are also significantly different for 
mother and father. We find remarkably little evidence of gender preference in this 
egalitarian society, consistent with the insignificant coefficients on the demographic 
categories in the expenditure regressions. The only significant interactions with the 
daughter dummy are found in the levels regressions:  using deviations from the cohort 
mean, daughters fare less well relative to boys of the same age when their mothers have 
more paddy land, while girls do better relative to boys of the same age when their 
mothers have more forestland. The result that daughters complete fewer years of 
schooling when their mothers have more paddy land is also shown in the schooling 
attainment regressions. It is possible, however, that daughters whose mothers have more 
paddy land may choose to acquire less human capital since they anticipate inheriting land 
in this matrilineal society. 
When we control for family-level unobservables, none of the interaction terms 
with the daughter dummy are significant. The Lagrange multiplier test also indicates that 
individual heterogeneity is important; moreover, the Hausman test does not lead us to 
reject random effects in favor of fixed effects. This suggests patterns of gender 
discrimination can be explained by factors that vary across families as well as individual 
differences, rather than unobserved family characteristics.  
The marked contrast between these two Islamic Asian societies—one patriarchal 
and patrilineal, and the other matrilineal—illustrates how difficult it is to predict the 
direction of gender preference without understanding the underlying culture and its 
customs regarding marriage, caregiving, and inheritance.  48 
   
Ethiopia 
Educational outcomes are presented for coresident children aged 6-20. Of note is 
that splitting the sample into smaller subsamples based on different age categories does 
not qualitatively change the results; the selection biases resulting from children leaving 
the home do not appear to be strong. 
Examining the levels results (Table 8), the first important finding is that girls are 
more likely to have less than the age specific mean education. While both mother’s and 
father’s schooling have a positive effect on the deviation from cohort mean, only the 
latter is significant, possibly picking up a wealth effect within the household. This effect 
is weaker for girls, however, as indicated by the negative effect of husband’s education 
interacted with a female dummy. 
As in the expenditure share regressions, dummy controls for village, ethnicity, 
and religion are also included in the levels regression. The negative ethnic group 
coefficients indicate that most of these groups have less education relative to the 
excluded Tigreans. Muslims also report on average significantly less schooling. 
Levels of husband’s and wife’s assets at marriage are neither significant on their 
own nor are they significantly different from one another. When interacted with the 
gender of the child, however, the impact of the wife’s assets is positive and significant, 
suggesting a gender preference, while the impact of the husband’s assets is small and 
insignificant. Furthermore, these effects are significantly different. In households where 
the wife brings more assets to the marriage, the educational outcome of girls improves.  49 
   
When we control for family level unobservables in the household fixed-effects 
specification presented in the second column, the same story emerges. Sons with better-
educated fathers and mothers (insignificant) seem to do better relative to other children of 
the same age. In contrast, daughters of wives bringing more assets to the marriage do 
better. In a society where education is uniformly low, particularly for women, it may be 
that assets are what drive women’s capability to exert their preferences. 
The third and fourth columns in Table 8 present the regressions using completed 
years of schooling as the dependent variable. As in Bangladesh, there are a large number 
of individuals with no schooling so it is important to consider different specifications. 
Despite this censoring, the results show a strikingly similar pattern to the specification 
using deviation from cohort means; girls in households with better-educated fathers and 
mothers bringing fewer assets to the marriage have less education. While not 
inconsistent, these findings are in contrast to those in the education expenditure shares 
regression of no difference between the influence of husband’s and wife’s assets, and are 
perhaps in part due to the power of the different types of tests. 
 
South Africa 
Average levels of education in South Africa have risen in recent decades (Thomas 
1996b) and the sample of children reflect this trend; few children do not progress through 
primary school and there is little variation among the younger cohorts. Therefore, the 
analysis presented in Table 9 focuses in on older students age 16-21 who are beginning to 
leave school in larger numbers.  50 
   
In the levels regressions on deviation from cohort means presented in the first 
column, wife’s education plays an important role in augmenting child education, though 
significantly less so for girls. In a society where boys are often important sources of old 
age security and women live longer, this may be an important investment strategy for 
mothers. The African assets at marriage measures are generally insignificant but wife’s 
assets interacted with an Indian dummy and a female dummy is positive and significant. 
Indian women who bring more assets to marriage appear able to positively influence their 
daughters’ educational outcomes. 
Controlling for household-level unobservables, the effects are similar to those 
described above, though operating through slightly different channels. In this 
specification, it is husband’s education that has a positive effect on girl’s education 
(rather than wife’s having a negative effect on boy’s education). In addition, husband’s 
assets at marriage (relative to wife’s) have a positive effect on girl’s education. Finally, as 
before, Indian wife’s assets at marriage positively affect girl’s educational outcomes. 
Turning to the regressions using years of schooling as the dependent variable, the 
results are nearly identical. This is not surprising, given that there is much less censoring 
in these data compared with the other countries because of higher educational levels in 
South Africa and the older age group under examination. The evidence regarding 
differences in gender preferences between Indian men and women is even stronger here, 
with women significantly favoring their daughters and men significantly favoring their 
sons (fourth column). The possibility that African, but not Indian, households in South  51 
   
Africa operate within a unitary framework has also been evidenced in work using men’s 
and women’s income measures (Thomas 1996b). 
 
5. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper tests the unitary model in a variety of country settings, using a 
common methodology and indicators of bargaining power that are exogenous to 
decisions made within marriage. While the use of assets at marriage as indicators of 
bargaining power is not new (see Quisumbing 1994 and Thomas, Contreras, and 
Frankenberg 1997, for examples), this paper is, to our knowledge, the first time that such 
data have been collected and analyzed for a number of countries using similar survey and 
analytical methodologies. Paying attention to country-specific nuances while using a 
common analytical framework has its pay-offs. While the framework may recommend 
different policy handles in each country, it also makes extracting generalizations much 
easier since the framework is based on a common set of assumptions.  
The individual cases reveal that circumstances in each country are quite different. 
Nevertheless, one can still learn from a comparison of the patterns across countries. For 
example, as Table 1 demonstrates, while assets may be difficult to measure precisely, 
women appear to bring far fewer assets to the marriage, both in terms of physical and 
human capital. (The only exception is in matrilineal Sumatra, where women bring more 
paddy land to the marriage. However, they have less schooling than their husbands.)  
While the expenditure share analysis focuses only on physical capital (assets) brought to 
marriage, there is also much evidence that differences in the human capital of husband  52 
   
and wife—education, age, and experience—have significant effects on intrahousehold 
allocation  (see, for example, Thomas 1994 and Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 
1997). The importance of human capital on intrahousehold allocation is illustrated in the 
section on individual educational outcomes. 
Table 10 presents the effects of the various measures of bargaining power for all 
four countries. Each column reports the sign of the significant coefficients for the 
measures of bargaining power in a specific country. For example, the fourth through sixth 
rows in the first column indicate that for the share of education expenditures in 
Bangladesh, the effect of wife’s assets are positive and significant, the effect of the 
husband’s assets are insignificant, and the difference between them is positive and 
significant.  
These results show that the unitary model of the household is, on the whole, 
rejected. This finding is stronger in the Asian countries than in the African ones, in the 
sense that the unitary model is rejected in more expenditure share equations in the 
former. While strictly speaking, rejection for any single equation implies the unitary 
model does not hold, there is a sense in which more rejections for a single country are 
evidence of the extent to which the unitary framework breaks down. As such, it appears 
that the model is most strongly rejected in Indonesia and represents a closer 
approximation to reality in South Africa, in part due to the sample selection issues 
described above. The rejection of the unitary model has implications for the design of 
policies designed to transfer resources to households:  the identity of the transfer recipient 
does affect the ultimate outcome of the intervention.   53 
   
Across countries, the most consistent effect is that relative resources controlled by 
women tend to increase the shares spent on education (in all countries but Ethiopia). 
While it is tempting to say that mothers are more altruistic than fathers, this behavior may 
have a sound economic basis. Given age differences at marriage (women are younger) 
and gender differences in life expectancy, it is possible that women invest in the 
education of their children more heavily since they are more likely to rely on them for old 
age support. In societies where key assets that assure lifetime consumption-smoothing are 
controlled by men (land, in many cultures; pensions and social security in countries with 
low female participation in the formal labor market), women may attempt to meet the 
same long-term needs with other instruments, such as investment in the human capital of 
healthy and educated children (Guyer 1997, 121). 
Having found that the most consistent effect at the household level was 
expenditures on education, we then turned to a more direct examination of educational 
outcomes. This provides a more relevant test by examining an outcome with which 
policymakers are directly concerned. In addition, it is a more powerful test since we can 
distinguish between the effects on boys and girls within households. The evidence 
described for years of schooling and deviations from cohort means supports the results 
from the expenditure share regressions (assets brought to marriage, including human 
capital by husband and wife, have differential effects on allocation in the household) but 
also suggests the mechanisms underlying the earlier results are quite complicated; indeed 
they differ substantially across the case studies. The expenditure share regressions  54 
   
indicated that more assets in the hands of women had a beneficial impact on budget 
shares for education, but did not tell us which of the children were benefiting. 
For example, in both Bangladesh and South Africa, there is evidence that more 
assets in the hands of women have a positive impact on the educational budget shares. 
Yet, in Bangladesh, fathers schooling (for the 6-10 year olds) and assets (for the 11-15 
year olds) have a negative impact on girls schooling, whereas in South Africa it is the 
opposite: fathers schooling has a positive effect on girls schooling while mothers assets 
brought to marriage have a negative impact on girls. In South Africa, the pattern may be 
partly justified using the old-age security hypothesis outlined earlier, but in Bangladesh 
this is not true and different preferences are more likely the underlying cause. Wealthier 
Bangladeshi fathers may attach a higher premium to marrying their daughters off earlier, 
an effect opposite to that of better-educated mothers. Finally, the differences found 
between parental effects on children of different gender provide further evidence that 
households in these four countries are not operating within a unitary framework.  
While one could rashly recommend unilaterally transferring assets to women, 
programs designed to transfer assets to women should be designed with caution. First, 
while the expenditure share evidence suggests more assets in the hands of women leads 
to higher budget shares for education, the beneficiaries of these gains (boys or girls or 
both) are different across the countries. These differences appear to be driven by both 
differences in preferences and underlying economic rationales possibly related to old-age 
support systems in different countries. An understanding of the latter is an important 
ingredient into policymaking aimed at exploiting these differences. Second, different  55 
   
assets may have different implications for bargaining power if “status” or prestige is 
attached to a particular asset. For example, in the Sumatran case, paddy land (which is 
considered a higher form of wealth) and forestland affect expenditure shares in different 
directions. Indeed, the special meaning or significance attached to ritual transfers such as 
dowries or brideprice should warn us against asset-transfer interventions that are 
designed without paying attention to cultural contexts. Lastly, we must also remember the 
possibility of compensatory (or even retaliatory) action by nonrecipients. The cases of 
husbands taking control of an irrigation project designed to preserve women’s control of 
rice in The Gambia (Dey Abbas 1997) and Bangladeshi wives borrowing money for their 
husbands’ use from credit programs ostensibly targeted to women (Kabeer 1997) are 
often mentioned as words of caution to policymakers. Even more disturbing is the 
possibility of increased domestic violence towards women, should income transfer 
programs radically alter the distribution of power between husband and wife (Schuler, 
Hashemi, and Riley 1997b).  
Our results also show that influences on intrahousehold allocation may be 
operating at different levels, with different implications for policy. For example, in the 
Ethiopian case, the effect of husband’s and wife’s assets was dominated by the site-
specific characteristics, ethnic and religious differences. This indicates that variations 
across communities and ethnic groups may be larger than variations in the asset position 
of men and women within those groups. In this case, legal reforms that affect property 
rights, or that equalize property rights across groups, might have a larger potential impact 
on intrahousehold allocation than redistributing resources among men and women within  56 
   
the group. Preliminary results (not reported here) on the distribution of assets upon 
divorce in Ethiopia, for example, show that having a written marriage contract, which is 
typical of some ethnic groups but not others, increases the share going to the woman. In 
the Bangladesh case, on the other hand, despite significant differences across sites, 
differences in asset positions of men and women within sites are large enough to warrant 
interventions to increase women’s assets relative to men’s.   57 
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Table 1—Assets at marriage and human capital of husband and wife 
  Husband    Wife 
   
Mean 
Standard 




           
Bangladesh           
 Assets at marriage (1996 taka)   81,929   145,584     7,064   8,472 
 Transfers at marriage (1996 taka)   4,053   15,014     5,856   11,646 
 Years of schooling   3.18   4.03     1.68   2.78 
           
Sumatra           
 Area of paddy land (hectares)   0.18   0.3     0.25   0.62 
 Area of forestry land (hectares)   0.9   1.64     0.42   1.03 
 Years of schooling   6.83   3.6     6.23   3.4 
           
Ethiopia           
 Land and livestock assets at marriage (1997 birr)   2,739   7,188     461   2,023 
 Total assets at marriage (1997 birr)   4,194   8,272     978   2,424 
 Years of schooling   1.9   1.9     1.3   1.1 
           
South Africa           
 Count of assets at marriage   1.99   1.98     0.8   1.21 
 Years of schooling   5.57   5     1.67   2.67 
  
Table 2—Bangladesh: Expenditure shares as a function of assets at marriage, 2SLS estimates (n = 1,920) 
   Food  Health  Education  Children's clothing  Cigarettes 
  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
Endogenous regressors                     
 Ln per capita expenditure   34.24  1.16  -21.84  -1.70  8.68  1.04  1.76  0.46  4.82  1.00 
 Ln per capita expenditure squared  -3.75  -1.62  1.85  1.84  -0.42  -0.64  -0.11  -0.36  -0.44  -1.16 
 Ln household size  -2.84  -2.67  0.51  1.11  0.57  1.92  -0.09  -0.64  -0.54  -3.11 
 Ln (husband assets +1)  0.42  1.29  0.18  1.28  -0.04  -0.41  0.03  0.68  0.07  1.36 
 Ln (wife's assets +1)  0.00  0.00  -0.34  -1.63  0.34  2.53  0.15  2.50  -0.06  -0.79 
Household demographics                     
 Share females 20-65  -8.07  -1.69  -1.09  -0.53  -2.08  -1.54  0.08  0.14  -0.10  -0.12 
 Share males 10-19  -5.02  -1.38  -0.76  -0.48  4.09  3.98  1.70  3.60  -0.76  -1.28 
 Share females 10-19  -4.81  -1.19  -0.30  -0.17  2.51  2.21  3.01  5.74  -0.62  -0.93 
 Share males 6-9  -3.64  -0.83  0.82  0.43  1.41  1.14  2.46  4.31  -1.04  -1.44 
 Share females 6-9  -3.05  -0.67  0.03  0.02  0.07  0.05  3.11  5.26  -0.87  -1.17 
 Share males 0-5  0.04  0.01  1.46  0.79  0.94  0.79  2.59  4.74  -2.16  -3.12 
 Share females 0-5  -8.93  -2.05  1.44  0.76  0.82  0.67  2.88  5.12  -1.55  -2.18 
 Share males 65+  -6.19  -0.81  0.77  0.23  8.10  3.74  2.99  3.01  -3.15  -2.50 
 Share females 65+  -0.87  -0.12  -8.10  -2.58  1.80  0.89  -0.29  -0.31  -1.57  -1.33 
Site and round dummies                     
 Saturia  -3.65  -4.62  -0.68  -1.99  0.87  3.91  0.42  4.13  0.35  2.74 
 Jessore  3.48  3.61  0.40  0.95  -0.17  -0.63  0.30  2.39  -0.27  -1.70 
 Round 3  1.26  1.57  -1.81  -5.17  -0.58  -2.57  0.61  5.82  -0.33  -2.48 
 Round 4  1.06  1.36  -1.23  -3.64  -0.76  -3.46  0.17  1.70  -0.32  -2.53 
Constant  7.64  0.08  68.63  1.69  -39.51  -1.50  -8.63  -0.71  -8.31  -0.54 
F-tests (p-values)                     
Husband's assets=Wife's assets  0.44  0.508  3.52  0.061  4.4  0.036  2.33  0.127  1.65  0.199 
Overid test(chi-square,p-value)  54.72  1  37.71  1  45.74  1  33.88  1  70.76  1 
F  13.68    2.56    17.03    11.23    5.58   
p-value  0    0    0    0    0   
Notes: Instruments:  Round 1 values: ln per capita expenditure, ln per capita expenditure squared, ln household size; for both husband and wife:  dummies for schooling (primary 
secondary, university (husband only), age and age squared, birth order, family background:  father's schooling, mother's schooling or literacy, parent's land, number of siblings, 
number of living brothers, year of marriage (see Tables 5-8). Assets in marraigage in 1996 taka; regressions on rounds 2, 3, and 4; t-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or 
better. 61 
   
Table 3—Sumatra expenditure shares regressions; tobit estimates (n = 114) 
  Food  Health  Education  Children's clothing  Tobacco 
  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln total expenditure per capita  0.319  0.777  0.199  0.859  0.209  1.662  0.365  2.116  1.544  3.184 
Ln total expenditure per capita squared  -0.019  -1.312  -0.007  -0.846  -0.008  -1.694  -0.013  -2.173  -0.056  -3.218 
Ln household size  -0.180  -5.739  -0.009  -0.516  0.016  2.150  0.004  0.410  0.070  2.778 
Household composition (males 20-65 excluded)                     
 Males 0-5  0.080  0.830  0.014  0.264  0.024  1.121  0.113  4.101  -0.009  -0.123 
 Females 0-5  0.109  0.970  0.003  0.049  -0.001  -0.050  0.108  3.409  -0.006  -0.068 
 Males 6-9  0.060  0.505  0.028  0.424  0.074  2.893  0.156  4.750  0.089  1.002 
 Females 6-9  0.072  0.694  0.053  0.910  0.039  1.720  0.142  4.892  -0.007  -0.095 
 Males 10-19  0.067  0.704  0.057  1.060  0.051  2.371  0.099  3.577  -0.048  -0.679 
 Females 10-19  0.125  1.383  -0.006  -0.115  0.074  3.637  0.113  4.339  -0.002  -0.029 
 Females 20-65  -0.157  -1.315  0.061  0.898  0.032  1.189  0.044  1.279  0.065  0.729 
 Males 65+  -0.008  -0.092  0.170  3.418  -0.028  -0.960  -0.013  -0.369  -0.065  -0.806 
 Females 65+  -0.112  -0.805  -0.110  -1.405  0.029  0.881  0.000  -0.004  -0.051  -0.461 
Landholdings at time of marriage (hectares)                     
 Husband's paddy land  -0.073  -1.874  -0.020  -0.901  0.011  1.269  0.015  1.390  0.052  1.800 
 Husband's forestry land  0.012  0.881  -0.001  -0.138  -0.008  -2.507  -0.002  -0.614  -0.011  -0.984 
 Wife's paddy land  0.014  0.471  0.037  2.153  0.014  2.312  0.002  0.236  -0.009  -0.415 
 Wife's forestry land  0.014  0.669  0.001  0.062  -0.003  -0.730  -0.005  -0.793  -0.002  -0.130 
Kerinci dummy  0.055  2.978  -0.013  -1.202  0.003  0.673  -0.004  -0.769  0.010  0.722 
Constant  -0.013  -0.004  -1.421  -0.860  -1.482  -1.674  -2.519  -2.082  -10.699  -3.157 
Sigma   0.075    0.043    0.014    0.019    0.053   
                     
F tests (p-value):                     
Husband's paddy=wife's paddy  3.150  0.079  4.170  0.044  0.140  0.712  0.910  0.343  2.800  0.097 
Husband's forestry land=wife's forestry land  0.000  0.950  0.020  0.900  0.610  0.435  0.090  0.759  0.200  0.656 
                     
Share uncensored  1    1    0.702    0.8421    0.772   
                     
LR chi2(17)  148.12    37.01    69.13    103.03    29.44   
p-value  0.00    0.0034    0    0    0.0307   
Notes: t-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better. 62 
   
Table 4—Ethiopia expenditure share regressions (two-stage least squares) n = 1,418 
  Food    Education    Health    Child clothing    Alcohol and tobacco 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic    Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln PCE  -7.602  -1.2    0.820  1.1    0.161  0.1    4.106  2.8    6.601  1.8 
Ln PCE 2  0.656  1.4    -0.061  -1.1    -0.026  -0.2    -0.315  -3.1    -0.395  -1.5 
Ln HH Size  1.003  0.9    0.144  1.5    -0.685  -2.1    1.196  4.4    0.642  0.9 
Household composition (Males 16-50 excluded)                     
 Females 1-5  -4.945  -1.0    -0.661  -2.1    -1.781  -1.0    -3.491  -2.8    7.294  2.2 
 Males 1-5  1.803  0.3    -0.902  -2.4    -0.944  -0.6    -3.920  -2.8    3.427  1.0 
 Females 6-15  -2.200  -0.6    0.447  1.5    0.976  0.8    0.593  0.5    2.102  0.8 
 Males 6-15  5.112  1.4    0.441  1.2    -1.349  -1.4    -0.486  -0.5    0.929  0.4 
 Females 16-50  -2.482  -0.6    1.172  1.4    -0.162  -0.2    -0.496  -0.4    1.550  0.6 
 Females 50 +  1.352  0.3    0.147  0.4    -1.238  -1.0    -1.986  -1.7    4.170  1.4 
 Males 50 +  11.482  2.4    0.860  1.1    -0.274  -0.2    -2.230  -2.3    0.239  0.1 
Ethnicity (Tigray excluded)                           
 Amhara  0.592  0.2    -0.166  -0.4    -0.462  -0.8    -1.017  -1.5    1.586  1.0 
 Oromo  3.421  0.9    -0.470  -1.0    0.647  0.8    -1.254  -1.7    1.211  0.6 
 South-Central  -1.028  -0.3    0.188  0.4    -0.131  -0.2    -0.818  -0.9    3.336  1.6 
 Other/mixed  4.489  1.4    -0.250  -0.7    0.082  0.1    -1.670  -2.4    2.230  1.2 
 Not identified  -4.228  -0.7    0.032  0.1    1.806  0.7    1.193  0.4    -2.905  -0.8 
Religion (Orthodox excluded)                           
 Muslim  -0.186  -0.1    -0.042  -0.2    0.571  0.7    -0.104  -0.2    -3.178  -1.6 
 Other Christian  5.669  3.0    0.394  0.8    -0.651  -1.1    -0.399  -0.9    -4.141  -3.2 
 Other  0.669  0.2    -0.031  -0.1    0.031  0.0    0.745  1.0    2.671  1.4 
 Not identified  6.114  1.0    -0.249  -0.4    -2.847  -1.1    -1.318  -0.4    4.761  1.4 
Ln Value assets at marriage                           
 Husband  -1.515  -1.5    -0.037  -0.3    -0.350  -1.2    -0.207  -0.7    1.543  2.4 
 Wife  2.648  1.8    -0.041  -0.3    0.624  1.4    -0.228  -0.6    -1.807  -1.7 
                             
F test overall  23.5  [0.00]    3.8  [0.00]    4.3  [0.00]    7.3  [0.00]    6.5  [0.00] 
F test Ln PCE quadratic  2.9  [0.06]    1.3  [0.28]    0.5  [0.61]    7.9  [0.00]    4.9  [0.01] 
F test husband = wife  4.1  [0.04]    0.0  [0.99]    2.2  [0.14]    0.0  [0.97]    5.3  [0.02] 
Fraction not censored  1.00      0.26      0.52      0.53      0.40   
Average budget share  0.74      0.01      0.02      0.02      0.04   
Notes: Regression also includes a constant and dummy control for all but one of the 15 villages (not shown). Husband and wife asset variables treated as endogenous. 
Instruments include parental education and value of gifts transferred from the groom's to the bride's family and vice versa. 
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Table 5—South Africa expenditure share regressions (two-stage least squares) n = 500 
  Food    Education    Health    Child Clothing    Alcohol and tobacco 
  Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic   Coefficient t-statistic 
Ln PCE  3.266  0.3    -6.072  -1.4    -1.247  -0.5    1.039  0.7    -0.213  0.0 
Ln PCE 2  -1.433  -1.5    0.551  1.5    0.115  0.5    -0.086  -0.6    0.036  0.1 
Ln HH Size  -6.393  -2.8    0.865  1.0    -0.630  -1.1    0.411  1.3    -0.048  0.0 
Household composition (males 16-50 excluded)                         
Females 1-5  -2.500  -0.3    5.806  1.5    -0.252  -0.1    0.501  0.4    0.290  0.1 
Males 1-5  -12.313  -1.1    1.653  0.4    3.114  1.1    -0.302  -0.2    4.965  0.9 
Females 6-15  -4.549  -0.6    4.166  1.4    0.913  0.5    2.109  1.9    -5.461  -1.4 
Males 6-15  -1.119  -0.2    0.865  0.3    -1.606  -1.0    1.119  1.3    -7.742  -2.4 
Females 16-50  4.200  0.7    3.404  1.4    -0.540  -0.3    -0.183  -0.2    -7.449  -2.3 
Females 50 +  -1.094  -0.1    0.637  0.2    -2.635  -1.1    0.325  0.2    -3.315  -0.7 
Males 50 +  5.376  0.6    -0.221  -0.1    4.173  1.9    -2.903  -2.4    -5.235  -1.2 
                             
Assets at marriage                             
Ln(count of husband assets at marriage)  7.680  0.9    -2.195  -0.7    -0.613  -0.3    0.122  0.1    -0.160  0.0 
Ln(count of wife assets at marriage)  -12.934  -1.3    7.411  1.9    1.420  0.6    -0.678  -0.5    0.655  0.1 
                             
Assets at marriage interacted with Indian                           
Ln(count of husband assets at marriage)  -7.512  -0.4    1.775  0.3    -2.060  -0.5    -2.182  -0.9    3.936  0.4 
Ln(count of wife assets at marriage)  41.483  1.3    -8.455  -0.7    -3.886  -0.5    2.974  0.6    -14.451  -0.9 
                             
F test of model: F(81, 418) =   4.7  [0.00]    1.3  [0.05]    1.2  [0.16]    2.1  [0.00]    1.5  [0.01] 
F test Ln PCE quadratic  29.3  [0.00]    1.1  [0.33]    0.1  [0.88]    0.2  [0.78]    0.0  [0.97] 
F test husband = wife  2.2  [0.14]    3.1  [0.08]    0.4  [0.56]    0.2  [0.68]    0.0  [0.91] 
F test Indian husband = Indian wife  0.6  [0.44]    0.0  [0.96]    0.0  [0.87]    0.7  [0.39]    0.9  [0.42] 
                             
Fraction not censored  1.00      0.88      0.77      0.80      0.55   
Average budget share  45.88      3.87      1.54      2.26      4.63   
Notes: Regression also includes a constant and dummy control for all but one of the 69 clusters (not shown). Husband and wife asset variables, and their interactions with 
Indian, treated as endogenous. Instruments include parental education, indicators of whether parents alive at time of marriage, and the value of gifts transferred from the 
groom's to the bride's family and vice versa.            
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Table 6a—Effects of husband’s and wife’s resources on children’s education, 
Bangladesh, deviation from cohort means 
  Coresident children ages 6-10  Coresident children ages 11-15 
 
OLS with robust 
SEs  Fixed effects 
OLS with robust 
SEs  Fixed effects 
Number of observations  1,210  1,210  1,466  1,466 
F test [p-value]  3.97 [0.000]  1.28 [0.258]  22.46 [0.000]  1.41 [0.197] 
R-squared  0.055      0.200     
Child characteristics                 
 Daughter dummy  0.045  0.664  0.062  0.812  0.119  0.409  0.580  1.908 
 Age   0.003  0.161  -0.019  -0.758  0.057  0.656  0.078  1.133 
 Age squared  0.000  0.152  0.002  1.017  -0.001  -0.533  -0.002  -1.458 
Parents' education                 
 Father's schooling  0.019  1.838      0.286  7.652     
 Mother's schooling  0.040  3.023      0.174  3.270     
Parents' assets at marriage                 
 Father's assets  0.000  -0.690      0.000  -1.054     
 Mother's assets  0.000  -0.010      0.000  1.009     
Interaction terms                 
 Daughter x father's schooling  -0.011  -0.929  -0.034  -2.163  -0.148  -2.827  -0.072  -1.207 
 Daughter x mother's schooling  -0.003  -0.183  0.025  1.116  0.164  2.232  0.050  0.555 
 Daughter x father's assets  0.000  0.894  0.000  -1.314  0.000  -0.009  0.000  -1.743 
 Daughter x mother's assets  0.000  -0.336  0.000  1.142  0.000  0.507  0.000  -0.592 
 Saturia dummy  0.111  2.140      1.113  3.918     
 Jessore dummy  0.046  0.928      0.887  2.863     
Constant  -0.196  -3.175  0.025  0.419  -2.591  -3.052  -0.620  -0.851 
F-tests on "main effects" (p-value)                 
 Father's schooling=Mother's schooling  1.070  0.302      1.940  0.164     
 Father's assets=Mother's assets  0.030  0.856      1.170  0.280     
F-test on equality of total effects (p-value)               
 Father's schooling=Mother's schooling  4.320  0.038      4.160  0.042     
 Father's assets=Mother's assets  0.450  0.501      1.390  0.239     
F-test on interaction terms with daughter dummy (p-value)             
 Father's schooling=Mother's schooling      2.980  0.085      0.760  0.383 
 Father's assets=Mother's assets      1.760  0.185      0.070  0.095 
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Table 6b—Effects of husband’s and wife’s resources on children’s education, 
Bangladesh, years of completed schooling 
  Coresident children ages 6-10  Coresident children ages 11-15 
  Tobit  Fixed effects  Tobit  Fixed effects 
Number of observations  1,210  1,210  1,466  1,466 
F test      99.710 [0.000]     28.130 [0.000] 
Chi-squared  803.130 [0.000]     486.710 [0.000]    
Child characteristics                 
Daughter dummy  0.331  1.461  0.099  1.250  0.133  0.401  0.556  1.783 
Age   2.740  3.707  -0.252 -9.428  0.792  9.115  0.804  11.413 
Age squared  -0.106  -2.398  0.040 16.028  -0.014  -7.212  -0.015  -9.591 
Parents' education                 
 Father's schooling  0.049  1.548      0.362  9.756     
 Mother's schooling  0.201  4.233      0.196  3.333     
Parents' assets at marriage                 
 Father's assets  0.000  -0.680      0.000  -1.005     
 Mother's assets  0.000  -0.431      0.000  1.314     
Interaction terms                 
 Daughter x father's schooling  -0.042  -0.870  -0.041 -2.558  -0.189  -2.843  -0.060  -0.983 
 Daughter x mother's schooling  0.007  0.094  0.045  1.923  0.166  1.618  -0.019  -0.205 
 Daughter x father's assets  0.000  0.972  0.000 -1.678  0.000  0.250  0.000  -2.077 
 Daughter x mother's assets  0.000  0.152  0.000  0.666  0.000  0.910  0.000  0.317 
 Saturia dummy  0.224  1.145      0.387  1.535     
 Jessore dummy  0.555  2.994      -0.606  -2.469     
Constant  -15.983  -5.198  0.209  3.391  -6.126  -6.602  -4.184  -5.600 
F-tests on "main effects" (p-value)                 
 Father's schooling=Mother's schooling  4.510  0.034      3.670  0.056     
 Father's assets=Mother's assets  0.120  0.732      2.060  0.152     
F-test on equality of total effects (p-value)               
 Father's schooling=Mother's schooling  5.770  0.016      2.120  0.145     
 Father's assets=Mother's assets  0.090  0.761      2.620  0.106     
F-test on interaction terms with daughter dummy (p-value)            
 Father's schooling=Mother's schooling      5.950  0.015      0.080  0.774 
 Father's assets=Mother's assets      0.830  0.363      0.490  0.486 
Breusch-Pagan LM test  (p-value)      23.600  0.000      20.240  0.000 
Hausman test, FE vs RE (p-value)      11.530  0.117      12.760  0.078 
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Table 7—Effects of husband’s and wife’s resources on children’s education, 
Sumatra (levels estimates are OLS with standard errors corrected for 
clustering) 
  Deviation from cohort mean  Years of schooling completed 
  Levels  Fixed effects  Levels  Fixed effects 
 
Co-
efficient  t-statistic 
Co-
efficient  t-statistic 
Co-
efficient  t-statistic 
Co-
efficient  t-statistic 
                 
Number of observations  178  178  178  178 
F test  2.74 [0.0014]  0.6 [0.7963]  63.14 [0.0000]  37.29 [0.0000] 
R-squared  0.1716      0.7728     
Child characteristics                 
 Daughter dummy  0.783  1.060  -0.209  -0.314  0.946  1.120  -0.326  -0.432 
 Age   0.111  0.598  0.016  0.069  1.597  7.857  1.549  5.792 
 Age squared  -0.004  -0.548  -0.001  -0.118  -0.033  -4.159  -0.031  -3.233 
Parents' education                 
 Father's schooling  0.065  0.922      0.080  1.346     
 Mother's schooling  0.103  0.837      0.164  1.404     
Parents' land                 
 Father's paddy  -0.245  -0.294      -0.260  -0.331     
 Father's forestland  0.076  0.817      0.053  0.560     
 Mother's paddy  1.737  4.866      1.121  2.918     
 Mother's forestland  -0.502  -1.473      -0.404  -1.277     
Interaction terms                 
 Daughter x father's schooling  -0.021  -0.278  0.016  0.155  -0.029  -0.392  0.006  0.049 
 Daughter x mother's schooling  -0.039  -0.381  0.029  0.236  -0.105  -1.048  0.031  0.223 
 Daughter x father's paddy  -0.686  -0.822  2.201  1.361  -1.024  -1.023  1.180  0.644 
 Daughter x mother's paddy  -1.648  -4.718  -1.512  -1.051  -0.985  -2.646  -1.584  -0.972 
 Daughter x father's forestland  -0.065  -0.572  0.095  0.405  -0.001  -0.009  0.075  0.282 
 Daughter x mother's forestland  0.830  1.783  0.464  0.523  0.740  1.642  0.533  0.530 
 Kerinci dummy  -0.155  -0.347      0.768  1.627     
Constant  -1.884  -1.372  -0.101  -0.066  -11.203  -7.017  -8.996  -5.161 
F-tests on “main effects” (p-value)                 
 Father’s schooling=Mother’s schooling  0.050  0.818      0.370  0.542     
 Father’s paddy=Mother’s paddy  5.100  0.027      2.890  0.093     
 Father’s forestland=Mother’s forestland  2.850  0.095      2.030  0.158     
F-test on equality of total effects (p-value)                 
 Father’s schooling=Mother’s schooling  0.050  0.818      0.010  0.941     
 Father’s paddy=Mother’s paddy  1.910  0.170      1.950  0.166     
 Father’s forestland=Mother’s forestland  0.870  0.353      0.660  0.419     
F-test on interaction terms with daughter 
dummy (p-value)                 
 Father’s schooling=Mother’s schooling      0.000  0.948      0.010  0.911 
 Father’s paddy=Mother’s paddy      3.430  0.068      1.480  0.228 
 Father’s forestland=Mother’s forestland      0.170  0.685      0.200  0.657 
Breusch-Pagan LM test (p-value)      24.450  0.000      29.130  0.000 
Hausman test, FE vs RE (p-value)      6.140  0.730      8.180  0.516 
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Table 8—Ethiopia education regressions on children age 6-19 (ordinary least 
squares) 
  Deviation from cohort mean    Years of Schooling 
  Level   
Household fixed 





efficient t-statistic  
Co-






efficient  t-statistic 
Child characteristics                       
 (1) if female  -0.388  -2.0    -0.065  -0.3    -0.379  -1.9    -0.067  -0.3 
 Age  -0.034  -0.7    -0.047  -1.0    0.008  0.2    -0.007  -0.1 
 Age squared  0.002  0.8    0.002  0.9    0.007  3.6    0.008  3.8 
Parent's characteristics                      
 Wife's age  0.042  2.8          0.042  2.8       
 Wife's age squared  0.000  -2.6          0.000  -2.6       
 Wife education  0.039  0.4          0.050  0.5       
 Husband education  0.366  6.6          0.372  6.7       
 Female X wife education  0.237  1.5    -0.113  -0.7    0.220  1.4    -0.117  -0.7 
 Female X husband education  -0.163  -2.2    -0.177  -2.3    -0.166  -2.2    -0.180  -2.4 
Ethnicity (Tigray excluded)                      
 Amhara  -0.404  -1.6          -0.398  -1.5       
 Oromo  -0.691  -2.7          -0.672  -2.7       
 South-Central  -0.422  -1.4          -0.433  -1.5       
 Other/mixed  0.091  0.3          0.099  0.4       
 Not identified  -1.030  -1.3          -1.045  -1.4       
Religion (Orthodox excluded)                      
 Muslim  -0.709  -4.4          -0.703  -4.3       
 Other Christian  -0.073  -0.6          -0.065  -0.5       
 Other  -0.130  -0.6          -0.132  -0.6       
 Not identified  -0.024  0.0          0.385  0.2       
Assets at marriage                      
 Ln(count of husband assets at 
   marriage)  -0.010  -0.8          -0.010  -0.8       
 Ln(count of wife assets at 
   marriage)  -0.023  -1.2          -0.025  -1.3       
                      
 Husband assets X female  0.016  0.9    0.017  1.0    0.016  0.9    0.017  1.0 
 Wife assets X female  0.068  3.0    0.064  2.8    0.073  3.2    0.068  3.0 
                      
F test of model   13.0 [0.00]    5.8 [0.00]    31.8 [0.00]    77.0 [0.00] 
F test husband = wife  0.3 [0.61]          0.3 [0.56]       
F test husband assets X female = 
wife's  2.7 [0.10]    2.1 [0.15]    3.1 [0.08]    2.5 [0.12] 
Notes: Level regressions include a constant and dummy control for all but one of the 15 villages (not shown). 
Household fixed effects regressions contain a dummy for each household. 
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Table 9—South Africa education regressions on children 16-21 (ordinary least 
squares) 
  Deviation from cohort mean    Years of schooling 
  Level   
Household fixed 




















                       
(1) if female  -0.235  -0.5    0.975  1.5    -0.222  -0.4    1.030  1.6 
Age  1.399  0.6    -1.157  -0.5    2.424  1.1    0.131  0.1 
Age squared  -0.037  -0.6    0.028  0.4    -0.052  -0.9    0.006  0.1 
                       
Wife's age  0.206  1.8          0.207  1.8       
Wife's age squared  -0.002  -1.8          -0.002  -1.8       
Wife education  0.130  2.5          0.130  2.5       
Husband education  0.024  0.5          0.024  0.5       
Female X wife education  -0.136  -1.8    -0.104  -1.1    -0.132  -1.8    -0.110  -1.2 
Female X husband education  0.078  1.2    0.136  1.8    0.070  1.1    0.135  1.8 
                       
Assets at marriage                       
 Ln(count of husband assets at 
   marriage)  -0.301  -0.9          -0.284  -0.9       
 Ln(count of wife assets at marriage)  0.049  0.1          0.040  0.1       
                       
 Husband assets X Indian  0.459  0.6          0.349  0.4       
 Wife assets X Indian  -0.886  -0.8          -0.899  -0.8       
                       
 Husband assets X female  0.386  0.9    0.974  1.9    0.393  1.0    1.031  2.1 
 Wife assets X female  -0.117  -0.2    -0.219  -0.4    -0.126  -0.3    -0.204  -0.4 
                       
 Husband assets X Indian X female  -0.864  -0.7    -4.387  -1.5    -0.829  -0.7    -5.230  -1.8 
 Wife assets X Indian X female  3.262  1.9    10.050  2.2    3.435  2.0    11.345  2.5 
                       
F test of model excl. cluster dummies  1.9 [0.02]    2.5 [0.01]    3.8 [0.00]    5.3 [0.00] 
F test husband = wife  0.4 [0.54]          0.3 [0.57]       
F test Indian husband = Indian wife  2.0 [0.16]          2.3 [0.13]       
F test Husband assets X female = wife's       1.7 [0.19]          1.9 [0.17] 
F test Indian husband assets X female = 
   wife's        3.7 [0.06]          4.9 [0.03] 
Notes: Level regressions include a constant and dummy control for all but one of the 69 clusters (not shown). 
Household fixed effects regressions contain a dummy for each household. 
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Table 10—Summary for all countries 
        Indonesia        South Africa 
    Bangladesh    Paddy  Forest    Ethiopia    (Africans only) 
                   
Food share                 
  Wife assets  -    -  -    Positive    - 
  Husband assets  -   Negative  -    -    - 
  Wife - husband assets  -    Positive  Positive    Positive    - 
                   
Education share                 
  Wife assets  Positive    Positive  -    -    Positive 
  Husband assets  -    -  Negative   -    - 
  Wife - husband assets  Positive    -  -    -    Positive 
                   
Health share                 
  Wife assets  -    Positive  -    -    - 
  Husband assets  -    -  -    -    - 
  Wife - husband assets  Negative    Positive  -    -    - 
                   
Child clothing share                 
  Wife assets  Positive    -  -    -    - 
  Husband assets  -    -  -    -    - 
  Wife - husband assets  -    -  -    -    - 
                   
Alcohol and/or tobacco share               
  Wife assets  -    -  -    -    - 
  Husband assets  -    Positive  -    Positive    - 
  Wife - husband assets  -   Negative  -    Negative    - 
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